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DEATH OF A BAIL BONDSMAN: THE IMPLEMENTATION 
AND SUCCESSES OF NONMONETARY, RISK-BASED 
BAIL SYSTEMS 
ABSTRACT 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that bail, 
when afforded to a criminal defendant, not be excessive. However, there is no 
provision as to what form bail must take or how it is to be determined. Starting 
in the twilight of the nineteenth century, monetary conditions of bail became 
increasingly prevalent throughout the United States. Yet, in recent years, there 
has been a movement to eliminate the requirement that defendants pay their way 
to pretrial freedom. States have taken measures to move away from cash bail, 
ranging from significantly limiting its use to outright prohibitions against 
monetary conditions on bail. The impetus behind such reform measures is that 
monetary conditions on bail discriminate against lower income defendants by 
disparately leading to pretrial detention of individuals who cannot afford to pay 
the required sum. 
This Comment analyzes the relative success of the risk-based, nonmonetary 
bail systems that several states have implemented. This Comment begins by 
analyzing the history of the right to bail in the United States, starting with how 
such a right was understood at the time of the founding. Next, the evolution of 
the application of bail and the considerations behind pretrial release or 
detention determinations, are discussed. This Comment then proceeds to analyze 
how risk-based, nonmonetary bail systems have been codified and applied. Last, 
this Comment evaluates the impact that these schemes have had on the states of 
implementation and potential alterations that would allow for better 
administration of such legislation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Through bail reform, New Jersey reduced its jail population by 25%1 and 
saved millions of dollars2 without an increased risk to public safety.3 At the same 
time, low income individuals were able to remain in good health4 and maintain 
employment. These positive outcomes resulted from nonmonetary, risk-based 
bail legislation in New Jersey,5 amongst other states. Despite their effectiveness, 
the adoption of nonmonetary bail systems has not been widespread, as only a 
limited number of states have implemented such schemes.6 
When payments are made a condition of pretrial release, there is a 
stratification between those who can afford to pay for their release and those 
who cannot.7 Certain presumptively innocent defendants “languish[] in jail 
weeks, months, and perhaps even years before trial,” simply because they cannot 
pay for freedom.8 Racial and ethnic minorities are more likely to be adversely 
affected by monetary bail provisions.9  
This Comment argues that risk-based bail provisions better protect the rights 
of pretrial defendants while imposing no additional costs—whether economic, 
administrative, or social—on the jurisdictions that administer them. This 
Comment proceeds in four Parts. Part I presents the history of the right to bail 
throughout Anglo-American law. The American understanding of the right to 
bail provides great discretion to the states in deciding how to afford their citizens 
the opportunity to pretrial release.10 Part II addresses shifting trends in the 
balance between the governmental interests in bail and the rights of pretrial 
 
 1 N.J. COURTS, JAN. 1–DEC. 31, 2017 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 4 (2017). 
 2 AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, STATE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT, PRETRIAL 
RELEASE REFORM 5. 
 3 N. J. COURTS, supra note 1. 
 4 See, e.g., Corinne Ramey, NYC to Pay $3.3 Million to Family of Teen Who Languished at Rikers Island, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2019, 6:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nyc-to-pay-3-3-million-to-family-of-teen-
who-languished-at-rikers-island-11548371523 (describing a pretrial defendant who committed suicide after he 
spent a long period of time in prison because his family could not afford his $3,000 bail).  
 5 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2017).  
 6 States that have adopted risk-based approaches to bail include Alaska, and Kentucky. See ALASKA 
STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); California passed such a 
bill, but it is currently being stayed pending a ballot proposition. See S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2018). 
 7 See MARIE VANNOSTRAND, NEW JERSEY JAIL POPULATION ANALYSIS 11, 13 (2013). 
 8 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 (June 22, 1966). 
 9 See Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic Lines Since 
End of Great Recession, PEW RES. CTR.: FACTTANK (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/ 
2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/. 
 10 See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984). 
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defendants. Namely, it presents the origins of modern bail systems that emerged 
following the federal Bail Reform Acts of 1966 and 1984.11 Part III explains the 
reasons for the adoption of risk-based bail systems and the form that such 
provisions take. By analyzing the specific characteristics of the defendant and 
the charged offense, courts seek to predict that defendant’s risk to public safety 
and likelihood of flight before trial.12 Finally, Part IV analyzes the level of 
success of nonmonetary bail systems and addresses major criticisms to and 
concerns over adoption of such provisions. 
I. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO BAIL 
“For the law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one 
innocent suffer.”13 This prominent quote by William Blackstone embodies the 
perspective that Anglo-American law takes toward the punishment of criminals. 
However, this axiomatic principle is not applied to those accused of a crime who 
are awaiting trial. Despite the presumption of innocence present in American 
law,14 accused persons are detained before they are afforded their constitutional 
right to a trial.15 Yet, bail provides a mechanism to allow accused, non-convicted 
individuals to maintain their liberty. Bail balances a defendant’s liberty interests 
with the government’s interest in preserving public safety and assuring a 
defendant appears in court as required.16 The right to bail has long been debated 
in Anglo-American law, as its availability has shifted throughout history with 
numerous codifications altering the scope of the right.17 
A. The Right to Bail in English History 
The first provision of a right to bail can be found in the thirty-ninth chapter 
of the Magna Carta, which was promulgated in 1215.18 That chapter provided 
that “no freeman shall be arrested or detained in prison . . . unless lawful 
 
 11 See Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3141–50 (2012)); Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (amended 1984). 
 12 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(b) (West 2017). 
 13 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2596. 
 14 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (holding that the “presumption of innocence in favor 
of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of . . . 
our criminal law”). 
 15 See, e.g., N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 20 (stating that pretrial jail population accounts for roughly half 
of the total jail population in New Jersey). 
 16 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2017); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 
2019); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 17 See generally Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 288 (3d Cir. 2018); Caleb Foote, The Coming 
Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 965–89 (1965).  
 18 Foote, supra note 17, at 965–66. 
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judgment of his peers and by the law of the land.”19 This wording did not 
explicitly state whether it applied to pretrial defendants as well as post-
conviction inmates. The Statute of Westminster, the First, partially clarified this 
ambiguity by setting forth a list of crimes for which pretrial bail had to be 
provided.20 The division was predominately between felonies, which were not 
bailable, and noncapital crimes, which were bailable.21 Despite the provisions of 
this law, courts often refused to bail accused persons.22 Instead, judges relied on 
the Magna Carta, which allowed for more judicial discretion, even though the 
new statute sought to remove this leeway.23 Such decisions were often motivated 
by the desire to appease the king by accepting the arguments of the attorney 
general over those of the accused individuals.24 This judicial abuse prompted 
debate in the House of Commons over how to give force to the Statute of 
Westminster.25 The House of Commons adopted the Petition of Right, which 
states that “no freeman in any such manner as is before mentioned, be 
imprisoned or detained.”26 Despite these efforts, judges still found ways to 
refuse bail to those for whom it should have been afforded.27 Most popular 
amongst these methods was either waiting extended periods before setting bail28 
or setting conditions of bail that were impossible for a person to meet.29  
A major advancement in the rights of the accused came with the passage of 
the Bill of Rights of 1689,30 which marked the first appearance of language 
similar to what would become the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.31 The pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights of 1689 stated, “That 
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted.”32 This enactment came out of the political 
 
 19 Magna Carta § 39 (1215), reprinted in ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., DOCUMENTS ON FUNDAMENTAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN TRADITION 249, 251 (1963). 
 20 Statute of Westminster, the First 1275, 3 Edw., c. 15 (Eng.) (requiring sufficient surety for the release 
of those accused of a bailable offense). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Foote, supra note 17, at 966. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 966–67. 
 26 House of Commons, Petition of Right (1628) (Eng.) (citing instances of judicial disregard for the 
Statute of Westminster). 
 27 Foote, supra note 17, at 968.  
 28 Judges would wait over a year before setting bail conditions. Jenkes’ Case, 6 How. St. Tr, 1189, 1208 
(1676). 
 29 Foote, supra note 17, at 967. 
 30 Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 W. & M., st. 2, c. 2, pmbl., cl. 10. 
 31 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 32 Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 W. & M., st. 2, c. 2, pmbl., cl. 10. 
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turmoil caused by the Glorious Revolution and abdication of the throne by King 
James II.33 After the tumultuous rule of James II and social unrest caused by 
religious tensions, the British Parliament sought to assure certain rights for the 
people of England and to grow the power of the legislative body.34 
Consequently, the English system of pretrial detention had three components: 
(1) a legislative determination of which crimes were bailable; (2) a right to 
habeas corpus to determine the conditions of bail, where allowed; and (3) a 
provision that bail could not be excessive.35 Each of these rights was seen as 
distinct and requiring legislative enactments to ensure them.36 It was against this 
backdrop that the American colonies, and later the United States, developed their 
own independent laws in regard to bail. 
B. The Right to Bail in the United States 
In the American colonies, colonial governments were the first to adopt 
pretrial detention legislation.37 Early forms of these provisions followed the 
English model by enacting separate legislation to provide a right to bail and 
protections from excessive bail.38 The 1790 Constitution of Pennsylvania 
exemplified this approach. In one section, it stated that “all prisoners shall be 
bailable . . . unless for capital offences,”39 thus creating a right to bail. A 
different section of that constitution established the right to be free from 
excessive bail by stating that “excessive bail shall not be required.”40  
The separate treatment of the right to bail and the ban on excessive bail 
demonstrated the understanding that these two rights associated with bail were 
separate before and at the founding of the United States.41 In fact, shortly before 
the drafting of the Bill of Rights, the Continental Congress passed the Northwest 
Ordinance, which included two separate clauses to ensure the two distinct 
rights.42 This law dictated that “all persons shall be bailable, unless for capital 
 
 33 ANDREW BLICK, BEYOND MAGNA CARTA: A CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM 84 (2015). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Foote, supra note 17, at 968. 
 36 See id. 
 37 See, e.g., MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES § 18 (1641). Similar language was included in the laws of many 
of the early colonies. Foote, supra note 17, at 975. 
 38 Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 289 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 39 PA. CONST. art. ix, § 14 (1790). 
 40 Id. § 13. 
 41 Foote, supra note 17, at 968. 
 42 NORTHWEST ORDINANCE art. 2. 
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offenses . . . all fines shall be moderate; and no cruel or unusual punishments 
shall be inflicted.”43 
Although the founders knew that the right to bail and the protection against 
excessive bail were separate concepts,44 the United States Constitution does not 
afford a right to bail.45 The Eighth Amendment provides that bail not be 
excessive,46 thus codifying only one part of the understanding of bail. The 
founders’ omission of language guaranteeing a right to bail was not the result of 
a concern over federalism, as the first Congress addressed this apparent 
oversight by passing the Judiciary Act of 1789,47 which provided that “for any 
crime or offense . . . the offender may . . . be arrested, and imprisoned or bailed 
. . . .”48 However, this formulation presented certain issues. First, it merely 
provided that a pretrial defendant may be bailed, not a right to bail under certain 
circumstances.49 Moreover, since the right to bail was statutorily passed, it was 
possible that the right could be eliminated or altered with relative ease.50 Since 
no such efforts to eliminate bail in all cases have been undertaken,51 courts have 
not ruled on whether the Eighth Amendment ensures such a right; therefore, the 
debate over the scope of the rights ensured by the Eighth Amendment persists.52 
Similarly, since the right to bail is not constitutionally assured, it is not 
incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.53 Yet, while 
the specifics may vary in how it is administered, bail is allowed federally and in 
every state.54 The common, modern American concept of bail is that of paying 
money, either to the court or a bail bondsman, to secure pretrial release.55 
However, when the bail provisions, both federal and state, were adopted, 
monetary bail was not in use.56 Instead, the common practice was a personal 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 Foote, supra note 17, at 976–77. 
 45 See generally U.S. CONST. 
 46 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required . . . .”). 
 47 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73.  
 48 Id. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2 (stating that Congress can pass bills by a majority vote of each house). 
Therefore, Congress could pass an updated version of the Judiciary Act that did not include the bail language. 
 51 There have been cases that have sought to invalidate certain bail provisions, but not to attack the right 
to bail in and of itself. See, e.g., United States. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987). 
 52 Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 287–88 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 53 Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (stating that only the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on 
excessive bail is incorporated against the states). 
 54 PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE STATE OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 17 (2017). 
 55 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2012). 
 56 A. HIGHMORE, JR., A DIGEST OF THE DOCTRINE OF BAIL IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES, at v–vi 
(Dublin, College-Green 1783). 
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surety, in which a third party would personally affirm that the accused would be 
present at trial.57 The surety was normally a close acquaintance of the accused 
who would take personal responsibility for the accused’s conduct while released 
on bail.58 The only imposition of a monetary penalty would be if, despite the 
assurances of the surety, the accused did not appear at trial.59 In such an instance, 
the court would demand payment from the surety.60 This practice is quite 
different than that of commercial bail bondsmen and monetary bail that is 
prevalent in modern times, which require a monetary payment as a condition of 
release.61 
Each state has considerable leeway to enact a bail system because the 
Supreme Court has put forth a broad definition of bail.62 The Court has defined 
bail as “the traditional right to freedom before conviction,” and “the right to 
release before trial, conditioned upon the accused’s giving adequate assurance 
that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty.”63 This definition 
does not mention what form those assurances must take.64 The sole limitation on 
the states’ bail provisions is the Eighth Amendment, which only guarantees that 
the “proposed conditions of release or detention not be excessive in light of the 
perceived evil” of the accused.65 The federal and state governments have 
freedom in defining the purposes of bail and the “perceived evil” against which 
they seek to protect.66 While due process protects against “detention or other 
forms of physical restraint prior to any determination of guilt,” an accused’s 
liberty interests are “subordinated where there has been an adjudication that 
detention is necessary because an arrestee presents an identified and articulable 
threat to an individual or the community . . . or to ensure [the accused’s] 
presence at trial.”67 Consequently, the constitutional protections of the Eighth 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause do not place significant restraints on 
the states’ ability to develop their own systems. 
 
 57 Id. at 197. 
 58 Comment, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 967–68 (1961). 
 59 June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the 
Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 520–21 (1983). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 289, 291 (3d Cir. 2018).  
 62 See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). 
 63 Id. 
 64 See generally id. 
 65 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987). 
 66 See, e.g., id. 
 67 Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 502 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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The shift from personal surety to monetary bail in most states is traceable to 
the late nineteenth century.68 As society shifted from the close-knit communities 
of the colonial period to the more transient culture of the frontier and American 
cities, the relationships necessary for a personal surety were eroded.69 This 
deterioration gave rise to the paid bail system.70 Pretrial defendants pay a portion 
of the monetary bail condition to a bail bondsman who assures the defendant’s 
appearance in court.71 If the defendant fails to appear, the bail bondsman is liable 
for the remainder of the monetary bail.72 From the first bail bond business in 
1898,73 bail-bondsmen are still commonplace in many states.74 While there is 
debate as to the right to bail in the United States, when bail is offered, the states 
are free to administer it as they see fit, so long as the conditions placed on it are 
not excessive in light of the circumstances.75 With such discretion to administer 
bail, the states and federal government have vacillated between more lenient 
forms and systems that favor pretrial detention. 
II. PRIOR SHIFTS IN THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM 
For roughly six decades, there have been expansions and contractions of 
both the rights of pretrial defendants and the power of courts.76 The tension 
between these two interests has been at the core of bail legislation. In the 1960s, 
people involved in the criminal justice system began to take an evidence-based 
approach to analyzing the best practices of the bail system.77 Congress passed 
the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966,78 which created a presumption of pretrial 
release that could be predicated, in many instances, on nonmonetary 
conditions.79 After this expansion of pretrial defendants’ rights, social unrest 
across the United States led many political actors to adopt law and order 
 
 68 Comment, supra note 58, at 967–68. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See, e.g., ARTHUR L. BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO 39–44 (1927). 
 71 See, e.g., Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 72 See, e.g., id. 
 73 Id. at 295 (referencing the article The Old Lady Moves On, TIME, Aug. 18, 1941).  
 74 See, e.g., Rachel Smith, Comment, Condemned to Repeat History? Why the Last Movement for Bail 
Reform Failed, and How This One Can Succeed, 25 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 451, 456 (2018). 
 75 United States. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987). 
 76 See, e.g., Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50 (2012); Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. 
No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (amended 1984). 
 77 See, e.g., SCOTT KOHLER, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: MANHATTAN BAIL PROJECT (1962). 
 78 See Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (amended 1984). 
 79 Id. 
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rhetoric,80 and ultimately tougher criminal procedures.81 The passage of the 
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 (hereinafter “the 1984 Act”) sparked 
preventative detention.82 This legislation led to an increase in pretrial 
detention,83 expanding judicial power at the expense of pretrial defendants. 
Section A will address the research behind and legislative provisions of the 
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 (hereinafter “the 1966 Act”). Section B will 
discuss the rise of tough-on-crime rhetoric and the subsequent advent of 
preventative detention that resulted from the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984. 
A. Attempts at a Risk Factor Analysis Model that Led to the Federal Bail 
Reform Act of 1966 
The trend toward monetary bail, rather than personal or nonsecured surety,84 
marked the dawn of perceived disparate treatment based on income of pretrial 
defendants.85 The 1966 Act contained three separate indicia that a defendant’s 
income should not be a determinant of pretrial detention, namely, the purpose of 
the act, the factors considered for release, and the right to reconsideration of 
release conditions.86 This Section discusses the key circumstances surrounding 
the adoption of the 1966 Act, including research into the treatment of pretrial 
defendants and risk factors that could predict a pretrial defendant’s likelihood of 
flight.87 As a result of these conditions, Congress passed the 1966 Act to limit 
the use of monetary bail,88 prompting states to adopt similar legislation.89 
The 1960s saw the first major attempts to address concerns over the 
monetary bail system.90 Seeing issues with the criminal justice system, journalist 
Herbert Sturz investigated pretrial detention.91 Sturz sought to remedy the fact 
that much of New York City’s prison population was made up of pretrial 
 
 80 See Walker Newell, The Legacy of Nixon, Reagan, and Horton: How the Tough on Crime Movement 
Enabled a New Regime of Race-Influenced Employment Discrimination, 15 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 
3, 14–15 (2013). 
 81 See Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50 (2012). 
 82 TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE ET AL., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL 
RELEASE 17 (2010). 
 83 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMPACT OF BAIL REFORM IN SELECTED DISTRICT 
COURTS 15–16 (1989). 
 84 See Comment, supra note 58, at 967–68. 
 85 Smith, supra note 74, at 454–55. 
 86 See Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, §§ 2–3, 80 Stat. 214, 214–15 (amended 1984). 
 87 See SCOTT KOHLER, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: MANHATTAN BAIL PROJECT (1962). 
 88 See Bail Reform Act of 1966 § 3. 
 89 Smith, supra note 74, at 455–66. 
 90 KOHLER, supra note 87. 
 91 Id. 
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detainees.92 Sturz studied pretrial detention in hopes of arriving at an alternative 
to monetary bail.93 After several months, Sturz developed a plan to eliminate 
monetary bail in favor of a risk-based model.94 Under this system, Sturz 
evaluated the employment history, family ties, and prior criminal records of 
defendants to determine the risk of flight before trial.95 Stronger employment 
history and ties to the community correlated with a lower risk of flight.96 A 
longer criminal record increased the likelihood of pretrial flight.97 Sturz made 
recommendations to judges to release or detain solely based on his factor 
analysis—recommendations with no monetary conditions.98 Armed with this 
new method, Sturz established a yearlong experiment to evaluate the efficacy of 
his model.99 This experiment used the risk-factor analysis on criminal 
defendants in New York City.100 Defendants for whom Sturz recommended 
release were set free without monetary bail in 60% of cases, and appeared in 
court in almost 99% of cases.101  
The success of Sturz’s program quickly gained national attention. The U.S. 
Department of Justice held the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice 
in 1964.102 This conference was to “focus nationwide attention on the defects in 
the bail system, the success of experiments in improving it, and the problems 
remaining in its reform.”103 After examining the efficacy of Sturz’s program, the 
federal government adopted a similar scheme in the 1966 Act.104 At the signing 
of this new law, President Lyndon B. Johnson stated that a poor pretrial detainee 
“languishes in jail weeks, months, and perhaps even years before trial. He does 
not stay in jail because he is guilty. . . . He does not stay in jail because he is any 
more likely to flee before trial. He stays in jail for one reason only—he stays in 
jail because he is poor.”105  
 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id.  
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. This success is slightly tempered by the fact that Sturz and his colleagues would contact defendants 
to remind them of the court dates and would even arrange for taxis to take them to court when needed.  
 102 Id. 
 103 NAT’L CONFERENCE ON BAIL & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM REPORT, at iv (1965). 
 104 KOHLER, supra note 87. 
 105 Johnson, supra note 8. The President noted the sole purpose of bail was to assure the defendant’s 
appearance in court, which is in stark contrast to later bail provisions discussed in Part II.B of this Comment. 
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The 1966 Act provided safeguards against income discrimination in pretrial 
detention determinations.106 The purpose of the act was to “revise the practices 
relating to bail to assure that all persons, regardless of their financial status, shall 
not needlessly be detained pending their appearance to answer charges . . . when 
detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest.”107 Under this 
law, any defendant charged with a noncapital offense was presumed eligible for 
release on personal recognizance or an unsecured appearance bond.108 Neither 
of these forms of pretrial release placed a monetary condition on release, as an 
unsecured appearance bond only required payment if the defendant failed to 
appear in court.109 The presumption of pretrial release could be overcome only 
if a judge found, “in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release [would] 
not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required.”110  
In such an instance, the act provided a list of five additional conditions that 
may be imposed upon the defendant’s release.111 The judge was to impose the 
first condition in the list that would “reasonably assure the appearance of the 
person for trial.”112 The first two conditions, placing the defendant in the custody 
of a designated person or placing restrictions on travel and association, were 
nonmonetary.113 The third and fourth condition of release, an appearance bond 
and a bail bond, were the only ones that allowed judges to require a defendant 
to pay for release.114 Since a judge has to use the first condition in this list that 
would assure the defendant’s appearance,115 monetary conditions could only be 
imposed in limited cases. The final item listed in the act allowed the judge to 
impose any other condition that would assure the defendant’s appearance.116  
To determine conditions of release, if any, a judge was to use a risk analysis 
that expanded upon Sturz’s factors.117 The 1966 Act included nine factors that 
 
 106 See id. 
 107 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 2, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (amended 1984). 
 108 Id. § 3. If the defendant were charged with a capital offense, he was to be treated in the same manner 
as a non-capital offender unless the judge believed that no condition of release would assure his appearance in 
court or that the defendant posed a danger to the community. This is the bill’s only reference in the bill to a 
danger to public safety. Id. 
 109 See, e.g., GEN. COURT OF JUSTICE, SUPERIOR AND DISTRICT COURT DIVISIONS FOR ROCKINGHAM 
COUNTY NC, ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER 2–4 (2012) (outlining the distinction between an unsecured appearance 
bond and a secured bond).  
 110 Bail Reform Act of 1966 § 3.  
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id.  
 114 Id.  
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See id. 
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judges were to consider in deciding whether to release a pretrial defendant: (1) 
“the nature and circumstances of the offense;” (2) “the weight of the evidence 
against the accused;” (3) the accused’s family ties; (4) the accused’s 
employment history; (5) the accused’s financial resources; (6) the accused’s 
“character and mental condition;” (7) the accused’s “length of . . . residence in 
the community;” (8) the accused’s criminal record; and (9) the accused’s record 
of appearance at past court dates.118 These factors add another protection against 
pretrial detention based on income. Since a judge was to consider the financial 
resources of the defendant,119 presumably the conditions placed on bail were not 
intended to detain individuals solely based on an inability to pay the monetary 
amount set by the judge. The bill also included the provision that any defendant 
who remained in detention for more than twenty-four hours, solely because he 
could not pay the monetary conditions for his release, was entitled to a 
reconsideration of those conditions.120 Consequently, the purpose of the act, the 
factors considered in determining release, and the right to reconsideration of 
release conditions, provided three separate indications and protections that a 
defendant’s income should not be a determinant in his pretrial detention. 
These federal reform measures prompted certain states to reexamine their 
own bail systems.121 States hoped to achieve the successes the federal 
government saw from release determinations based on risk, which relied less on 
monetary bail conditions.122 In fact, certain states were willing to go further than 
the reforms adopted by the federal government.123 For example, a handful of 
states eliminated the commercial bail industry, and instead only allowed for 
secured appearance bonds, paid to the court.124 As a result of these reforms, 
pretrial defendants were detained at drastically lower rates and were treated 
equally, regardless of financial status.125 This expansion of the rights of pretrial 
defendants was short-lived, and there was a great retraction of them as tough-
on-crime rhetoric emerged in the subsequent decades.126 
 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Smith, supra note 74, at 455–56. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, KY. COURT OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL REFORM IN KENTUCKY 3 
(2013). 
 125 Smith, supra note 74, at 455–56. 
 126 See MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 53 (1999). 
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B. Tough-on-Crime Measures and Implementation of Preventative Detention 
The 1984 Act was the culmination of nearly two decades of criticism of the 
perceived leniency of its predecessor, the 1966 Act. As politicians sought votes, 
they adopted tough-on-crime rhetoric127 that was then translated into federal 
legislation. The 1984 Act eroded the protections afforded to pretrial 
defendants.128 Namely, adding a defendant’s risk to public safety as a factor in 
bail determinations led to the rise of preventative detention, and an expansion of 
pretrial incarceration.129 The Supreme Court upheld the practice of preventative 
detention,130 despite persistent concerns over its implementation.131 
In the decades following the 1966 Act, there was great social unrest in the 
United States, which led to an increased desire for the rule of law.132 This goal 
was achieved by granting courts a greater ability to punish defendants both 
pretrial and post-conviction.133 With tense race relations, the beginning of the 
War on Drugs, and continuing resistance to the Vietnam War, politicians began 
appealing to the electorate’s desire for stability and law and order.134 This 
rhetoric was effective because 81% of Americans believed that law and order 
was declining.135 In fact, that issue was reported to be the key concern in the 
1968 presidential election.136 These fears were illustrated most notably in the 
1988 presidential campaign, in which Michael Dukakis was criticized for his 
policies on crime.137 In that election cycle, George H. W. Bush launched a 
critical ad campaign which told the story of Willie Horton.138 A television 
commercial detailed how Willie Horton, who was serving a life sentence without 
the possibility of parole for a brutal murder, was granted weekend furloughs, 
which allowed him to escape prison and rob, stab, and rape a couple.139 
 
 127 See, e.g., Newell, supra note 80, at 14–15. 
 128 See Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50 (2012). 
 129 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 83, at 15–16. 
 130 United States. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).  
 131 AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE 32–33 (3d ed. 2007). 
 132 See Newell, supra note 80, at 14–15. 
 133 See id. at 5. 
 134 See, e.g., id. at 14–15. 
 135 MAUER, supra note 126, at 53.  
 136 MICHAEL FLAMM, LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME, CIVIL UNREST, AND THE CRISIS OF LIBERALISM IN 
THE 1960S, at 162 (2005).  
 137 Newell, supra note 80, at 16. 
 138 See id. 
 139 Erin Blakemore, How the Willie Horton Ad Played on Racism and Fear, HISTORY (Nov. 2, 2018), 
https://www.history.com/news/george-bush-willie-horton-racist-ad; Doug Criss, This Is the 30-Year Old Willie 
Horton Ad Everybody Is Talking About Today, CNN (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/01/politics/ 
willie-horton-ad-1988-explainer-trnd/index.html. 
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Against this social backdrop, the government passed legislation that 
overhauled the criminal justice system, including pretrial detention.140 
Beginning in the 1970s, “a new era of the bail reform movement, one 
characterized by heightened public concern over crime, including crimes 
committed by persons released on bail,” emerged.141 While little evidence was 
cited to support the claim that released pretrial defendants were committing 
crimes at higher rates, tough-on-crime politicians validated their positions with 
sensationalized stories.142 Crimes committed by defendants on pretrial release 
were highly publicized, which led to “growing dissatisfaction with laws that did 
not permit judges to consider danger to the community” when making pretrial 
release determinations.143 As a result, Congress passed the District of Columbia 
Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, applicable only in the 
nation’s capital, which allowed judges to consider public safety, not just risk of 
failure to appear at court, when determining whether to release or detain pretrial 
defendants.144 The ability for judges to detain individuals to prevent a risk that 
they would reoffend while awaiting trial became known as preventative 
detention.145  
The overhaul of bail in the nation’s capital was expanded across the United 
States.146 Over a decade after the change of bail considerations in the District of 
Columbia, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,147 
which contained the 1984 Act.148 The first difference between the 1984 
legislation and the 1966 Act is the addition of public safety as a purpose of bail 
for defendants in noncapital cases.149 The 1984 version of the statute stated that 
a person is presumed to be eligible for release on personal recognizance or 
unsecured appearance bond “unless the judicial officer determine[d] that such 
release [would] not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required 
or [would] endanger the safety of any other person or the community.”150 
Additionally, the 1984 statute eliminated the distinction between defendants 
 
 140 See, e.g., Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50 (2012); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. § 10101 (2012)). 
 141 PRETRIAL SERVS. RES. CTR., THE SUPERVISED PRETRIAL RELEASE PRIMER 5 (1999). 
 142 See, e.g., Criss, supra note 140. 
 143 PRETRIAL SERVS. RES. CTR., supra note 141. 
 144 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 17. 
 145 Id. 
 146 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150. 
 147 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1). 
 148 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150. 
 149 Id. § 3142(b). 
 150 Id. 
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charged with capital and non-capital offenses.151 The 1966 Act considered risk 
to public safety for defendants charged with capital offenses.152 However, since 
public safety was now a consideration, in all cases, even for noncapital offenses, 
there no longer existed a need for a differentiation between the two categories 
of crimes. 
Under the 1984 Act, there was an expansion of potential conditions of 
release that a judge could place upon a pretrial defendant.153 If these conditions 
were not met, then the defendant was not eligible for bail, and thus the judge’s 
analysis would stop.154 In addition to the conditions listed in the 1966 Act,155 
which were designed to assure the defendant’s appearance in court, the 1984 
legislation contained nine additional potential release conditions that would 
assure public safety.156 Such conditions included avoiding contact with the 
victim of the charged crime, reporting to a parole officer, refraining from 
possession of a firearm, and refraining from alcohol or other intoxicants.157 The 
1984 Act also appeared to have increased the protections against judicial 
discrimination against lower-income defendants.158 It mandated that judges “not 
impose a financial condition [of release] that results in the pretrial detention” of 
the defendant.159 Despite this bar on detaining defendants pretrial solely due to 
an inability to pay monetary conditions of bail, many defendants who had a 
monetary condition imposed on their release were nonetheless held in prison for 
that exact reason, whether under the federal statute or state equivalents.160 
However, the 1984 Act allowed a judge to detain pretrial defendants in a 
greater number of cases.161 Under the 1966 version of the bail statute, a judge 
could only subject an individual to pretrial detention if the judge found that no 
condition of release would assure the individual’s presence in court.162 The 1984 
 
 151 Compare id. § 3142, with Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3, 80 Stat. 214, 214–
16 (amended 1984). 
 152 Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 § 3.  
 153 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). This version of the federal bail statute still required that a judge use the 
least restrictive condition or combination of conditions that would achieve the listed purposes of bail. Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 § 3; see supra notes 113–116 (discussing the possible conditions that 
a judge could impose on a pretrial defendant’s release). 
 156 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). 
 157 Id.  
 158 See id. § 3142(c)(2). 
 159 See id.  
 160 See, e.g., VANNOSTRAND, supra note 7, at 13 (noting that nearly forty percent of New Jersey’s jail 
population was comprised of pretrial detainees who had the option for release on monetary conditions but lacked 
the resources to do so). 
 161 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). 
 162 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (amended 1984). 
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Act allowed judges to temporarily detain individuals who committed an offense 
while awaiting trial for a felony, while awaiting imposition of a sentence, while 
on probation or parole, or who were not citizens of the United States.163 Such 
detention was not to exceed ten business days, so as to allow the court presiding 
over the new offense to notify the court or probation officer overseeing the prior 
crime.164 Additionally, judges were permitted to detain defendants until and 
through their trial if “the judicial officer [found] that no condition or 
combination of conditions [would] reasonably assure the appearance of the 
person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.”165 
Moreover, if the defendant had previously been convicted of a crime of violence, 
a crime involving a firearm, certain drug offenses, or a crime against a minor, 
there was a rebuttable presumption that no conditions of release would assure 
the purposes of bail, and thus the defendant should be detained while awaiting 
trial.166 
In arriving at a decision of pretrial release or detention, a judge, under the 
1984 Act, was to consider four factors, which related to both the risk of flight 
and the danger to the public posed by the defendant.167 First, the judge was to 
evaluate the “nature and circumstances of the offense charged.”168 Detention 
was more likely for crimes of violence, crimes of terrorism, crimes involving a 
minor victim, or crimes involving controlled substances, firearms, or other 
destructive devices.169 Second, the judge was to consider the weight of evidence 
against the defendant.170 The greater the evidence against the defendant, the 
more likely he was to attempt to flee while awaiting trial.171 Third, the judge was 
to weigh the history and characteristics of the defendant.172 This factor had two 
parts, one which relates to the risk of flight and one that corresponds to public 
safety.173 The person’s family ties, employment history, financial ties, and 
community connection174 relate to the likelihood that he will attempt to flee 
before trial. If the defendant, at the time of the charged offense, was on 
 
 163 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(2). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. § 3142(e)(1). 
 166 Id. § 3142(e)(3)(A)–(E). 
 167 Id. § 3142(g). 
 168 Id. § 3142(g)(1). 
 169 Id.  
 170 Id. § 3142(g)(2). 
 171 Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, Assignment Judge, Vicinage 10 Superior Court of New 
Jersey (Nov. 16, 2018). 
 172 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). 
 173 Id. § 3142(g)(3)(A)–(B). 
 174 Id. § 3142(g)(3)(A). 
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probation, parole, or awaiting trial or sentencing for another offense,175 it is more 
likely that he would reoffend, thus increasing the chance that a judge would use 
preventative detention to ensure the public safety. Last, the judge was to consider 
the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community as a 
whole.176 This factor directly embodies the public safety purpose of bail under 
the 1984 legislation.177 The 1984 Act led to concerns, both administrative and 
constitutional, within court systems. 
C. Implementation of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 
The great discretion and power that judges had to detain pretrial defendants 
under the 1984 Act was the subject of litigation on the grounds that it violated 
the constitutional provisions of the Due Process Clause and the Eighth 
Amendment.178 The Supreme Court considered these arguments in United States 
v. Salerno.179 In that case, Anthony Salerno and Vincent Cafaro were charged in 
a twenty-nine count indictment for RICO violations, conspiracy to commit 
murder, mail and wire fraud, extortion, and several gambling violations.180 At 
their arraignment hearing, the court found that no condition of release would 
assure the public safety.181 The defendants appealed the determination of pretrial 
detention by the District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming 
that allowing judges to detain defendants “on the ground that the arrestee is 
likely to commit future crimes” was facially unconstitutional.182  
The Unites States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that the 
provisions of the 1984 Act that allowed for pretrial detention to protect public 
safety were “repugnant to the concept of substantive due process” because they 
allowed for the “total deprivation of liberty simply as a means of preventing 
future crimes.”183 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Second Circuit, 
holding that “extensive safeguards” in the 1984 Act “suffice to repel a facial 
challenge.”184 Such safeguards include the right to counsel, the right of the 
defendant to testify, the right to confront witnesses, the statutorily enumerated 
 
 175 Id. § 3142(g)(3)(B). 
 176 Id. § 3142(g)(4). 
 177 Id. § 3142(e)(1). 
 178 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 18. 
 179 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984). 
 180 Id. at 743. At the hearing, evidence was presented that “Salerno was the ‘boss’ of the Genovese crime 
family of La Cosa Nostra and that Cafaro was a ‘captain’” of that crime ring. Id. 
 181 Id.  
 182 Id. at 744. 
 183 Id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 749 F.2d 64, 71–72 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
 184 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752. 
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factors that a judge can consider, the burden of proof of clear and convincing 
evidence, and the mandate that the arraignment judge includes written findings 
of fact in his final decision.185 Additionally, the Supreme Court held that, “given 
the legitimate and compelling regulatory purposes of the Act and the procedural 
protections it offers . . . the Act [was] not facially invalid under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.186 The Supreme Court also found no basis to 
the Eighth Amendment challenge that preventative detention is an excessive 
form of bail.187 The Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause does not 
contain any language that “limits permissible Government considerations [for 
bail] solely to questions of flight.”188 So long as the purposes and factors 
underlying bail determinations are not excessive in light of the perceived threat 
posed by the defendant, the Eighth Amendment is not violated.189 Therefore, 
with the compelling governmental interest in public safety, preventative 
detention is not excessive.190 
Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Salerno, many jurisdictions 
expanded their use of preventative detention.191 Before the Salerno ruling, the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Prosecution Standards called for limited use 
of preventative detention.192 However, once preventative detention was ruled 
constitutional, the National Adult Protective Services Association (NAPSA)193 
and the ABA Prosecution Standards recommended that increased weight be 
placed on public safety when making pretrial release or detention decisions.194 
Much like after the 1966 Act,195 state legislatures followed the example of 
Congress in enacting new bail statutes comparable to the federal legislation.196 
Within roughly a decade of the Salerno decision, forty-four states and the 
District of Columbia had added public safety as a factor to weigh in pretrial 
release decisions.197  
 
 185 Id. at 751–52. 
 186 Id. at 752. 
 187 Id. at 754–55. 
 188 Id. at 754. 
 189 Id.  
 190 Id. at 754–55. 
 191 See SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 18.  
 192 Id. 
 193 NAPSA is a nonprofit organization that gathers and shares information on best practices for protecting 
victims of elder abuse. About NAPSA, NAT’L ADULT PROTECTIVE SERVICES ASS’N, http://www.napsa-
now.org/about-napsa/overview/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2020). 
 194 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 18. 
 195 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (amended 1984). 
 196 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 18. 
 197 Id. 
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Despite the federal and state governments’ embrace of preventative 
detention, concerns persisted with its implementation.198 The 1984 Act 
mandated that judges not impose a financial condition that resulted in the pretrial 
detention of an individual.199 Compliance with this requirement necessitated a 
“careful scrutiny of information about the defendant’s background and financial 
circumstances,” but allegedly, as of 2007, “no states [had] yet adopted a system” 
to effectively comply with this obligation.200 In many jurisdictions, “decisions 
about pretrial detention or release were made with little or no information about 
the financial circumstances.”201 More striking is that the lack of knowledge of 
the defendants’ circumstances was not limited to their financial resources.202 
Courts often lacked information about any risk a defendant posed to public 
safety or flight.203 Arraignment hearings were “hurried initial appearance 
proceedings in which the defendant is without counsel.”204 With such limited 
knowledge of the nature of and circumstances surrounding each defendant, 
courts could not meaningfully promote the purposes of preventing flight and 
protecting the public safety without detaining a large number of pretrial 
defendants.205 
In 1989, when preventative detention was still growing, the United States 
General Accounting Office (GAO) completed a report comparing the effects of 
the Bail Reform Act of 1966 to that of 1984.206 The report’s findings evinced 
the greater power to detain pretrial defendants under the 1984 legislation.207 The 
total detention rate for pretrial defendants rose from 26% to 31%.208 This 
increase in detention rate, however, was not attributable to a failure to pay a 
monetary condition for release, as that figure decreased.209 The increase in 
pretrial detention was due to risks of flight or danger to the public safety.210 The 
report also found that the 1984 Act was more effective in ensuring its purposes 
 
 198 See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 132, at 32–33. 
 199 Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (2012).  
 200 The ABA did not cite any support for this assertion, nor did it mention any legal challenges to these 
deficiencies. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 132, at 32. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 VANNOSTRAND, supra note 7, at 11, 13. 
 206 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 19. 
 207 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 83, at 15–16. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Pretrial defendants who remained in custody for failure to pay monetary bail dropped by nearly 10%. 
Id. at 16–17. 
 210 Id. at 16. 
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than the 1966 version.211 The number of defendants released before trial who 
failed to appear in court decreased.212 Additionally, the number of released 
pretrial defendants who committed another offense declined from 1.8% to just 
0.8%.213 A chief complaint that the GAO found with regard to the 1984 bail 
legislation was the amount of time required for detention hearings.214 With more 
factors and evidence to consider regarding each defendant’s risk of flight or 
danger to public safety,215 detention hearings were more time-consuming. 
Many states still rely on preventative detention.216 While some jurisdictions 
do not place monetary conditions of bail as often as others,217 detention due to a 
risk to public safety persists.218 With the continued lack of information about 
pretrial defendants’ risk of flight or danger to public safety,219 issues continue 
over the detention of individuals solely on the basis of financial resources.220 It 
is against this backdrop that a new wave of reform movements have emerged in 
states such as New Jersey, California, Kentucky, and Alaska.221 
III. NONMONETARY BAIL SCHEMES 
As a result of the concerns raised over the 1984 Act and its state counterparts, 
certain states have sought to adopt alternatives that more closely align with the 
1966 federal enactment. In addition to the growth of prison populations, 
concerns over disparate treatment based on income level catalyzed these bail 
reforms.222 To respect the rights of pretrial defendants, certain states have 
adopted legislation to limit or eliminate monetary condition on bail.223 These 
new bail provisions, known as risk-based systems, use certain factors that are 
predictive of a defendant’s risk of flight and danger to public safety.224 Eligible 
 
 211 See id.; see also SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 19. 
 212 Under the 1966 bail statutes, 2.1% of defendants failed to appear, while under the 1984 enactment, 
only 1.8% did so. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 83, at 16; see also SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 
82, at 19. 
 213 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 19. 
 214 Id. 
 215 See Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2012). 
 216 See, e.g., id. § 3142. 
 217 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 19. 
 218 See, e.g., NEW JERSEY COURTS, supra note 1, at 8.  
 219 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 82, at 19 (noting that Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, and Wisconsin 
outlawed commercial bail bonds). 
 220 See, e.g., VANNOSTRAND, supra note 7, at 11, 13. 
 221 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); S. 
10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 222 See generally N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 7. 
 223 See, e.g., S. 10, 2017–2018; Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.10(d) (Cal. 2018). 
 224 Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/ 
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defendants are classified based perceived risk, and then assigned certain 
nonmonetary conditions of release.225  
A. Jurisdictions and Purposes of Adoption of Risk-Based Models 
Critics maintained that under the preventative detention statutes that 
followed the 1984 Act, the rights of pretrial defendants were not respected.226 
Further, defendants detained while awaiting trial suffer a number of negative 
effects,227 and monetary conditions on bail disproportionately impact lower 
income individuals and minorities.228 To address these concerns, certain states 
have transitioned from resource-based bail determinations to a risk-based 
analysis.229 
Monetary bail systems permeate throughout the criminal justice process, not 
only the pretrial stage.230 The detention itself costs people their jobs while 
detained, causing negative health effects, and depriving individuals of their 
liberty interests.231 These negative aspects of pretrial detention lead a number of 
accused individuals to plead guilty to escape pretrial detention.232 As the 
adjudication process progresses, those who are detained pretrial are convicted at 
higher rates, sentenced to prison more often, and receive longer sentences than 
those who are released pretrial.233 A portion of the increased conviction rates for 
defendants detained before trial may be attributable to the fact that they were 
found to pose a greater risk of flight or danger to public safety. Yet, since a large 
number of defendants remain in prison solely due to an inability to pay a 
monetary condition,234 economic standing plays a significant role in determining 
the ultimate outcome of a criminal case. 
One aspect that reform proponents find most troubling about the money-bail 
system is the disparate treatment of accused individuals based on income levels. 




 225 See, e.g., S. 10, 2017–2018; Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.10 (Cal. 2018). 
 226 Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, supra note 225. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 229 See, e.g., S. 10, 2017–2018; Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.9 (Cal. 2018). 
 230 Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, supra note 225. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Holland, 895 F.3d at 280 (stating that defendants plead guilty to non-jail sentences rather than remain 
in jail and argue their case at trial).  
 233 Id. 
 234 VANNOSTRAND, supra note 7, at 11, 13. 
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pay for their release.235 Individuals with greater resources can pay for their 
release, even if their crime is of a more serious nature and they pose a greater 
danger to the community.236 The more serious the crime, the higher monetary 
amount the defendant has to pay in order to secure his pretrial release.237 The 
monetary conditions are set regardless of the defendant’s financial resources,238 
thus if a defendant has greater wealth, he can meet such conditions. However, 
lower-income defendants are detained pretrial because they cannot afford their 
bail, even for less serious or nonviolent crimes.239 In New Jersey in 2012, 38.5% 
of the total jail population had the option to post bail, but did not have the 
resources to do so.240 More striking is the fact that one-third of the individuals 
who remained in prison pretrial, even though they were eligible for bail, did so 
because they could not pay $2,500 or less.241 Many who support reform want to 
move from this “resource-based” model to a “risk-based” model, as a risk-based 
model would better assure the purpose of bail.242 As a result of the troubling 
statistics regarding pretrial detention, New Jersey proposed an amendment to its 
constitution, which was ultimately approved through a ballot measure vote in 
the 2014 election.243 Other states, including Kentucky and California, have taken 
similar measures, by passing legislation, to transition from resource-based to 
risk-based bail practices.244 
Risk-based models, as the name indicates, make detention decisions based 
on the risk posed by the specific defendant. Risk, as defined in certain statutes, 
has multiple components.245 The California, Kentucky, and New Jersey 
provisions include likelihood of appearance in court and probability of the 
accused committing a crime while on pretrial release.246 New Jersey’s statute 
 
 235 Holland, 895 F.3d at 279. 
 236 Id. at 280. 
 237 See, e.g., SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL., CTY. OF ORANGE, 2018 UNIFORM BAIL SCHEDULE: FELONY AND 
MISDEMEANOR 3–10 (2018). 
 238 See, e.g., id. at 14. 
 239 Holland, 895 F.3d at 280. 
 240 VANNOSTRAND, supra note 7, at 11, 13. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Holland, 895 F.3d at 280. 
 243 DIV. OF ELECTIONS, DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICIAL LIST: PUBLIC QUESTION RESULTS FOR 11/04/2014 
GENERAL ELECTION PUBLIC QUESTION NO. 1, at 1 (2014) (stating that the measure passed by a margin of 61.8% 
to 38.2%).  
 244 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019) (taking effect on June 8, 2011); S. 10, 2017–
2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (this bill was supposed to take effect on Oct. 1, 2019, but is currently stayed 
pending a referendum vote).  
 245 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-25 (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) 
 246 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–
2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
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adds, as a third component of risk, the chance that the accused will “obstruct or 
attempt to obstruct the criminal justice process.”247 To determine whether to 
release or detain an individual while awaiting trial, courts in risk-based states 
weigh the risk of the defendant under each of these purposes. 
There are multiple states that have adopted legislation to move to risk-based 
pretrial detention decisions. Among the early adopters are Arizona, Kentucky, 
and New Jersey.248 These states rely on an algorithm created by the Laura and 
John Arnold Foundation (now Arnold Ventures) to help judges assess the risk 
that the accused will commit a new crime or will not appear at scheduled court 
dates.249 This algorithm, known as a public safety assessment, was developed 
through a survey of 750,000 cases from roughly 300 jurisdictions250 to determine 
the data points that best predict an accused’s risk to public safety and likelihood 
of flight.251 The new bail systems in these states still retain monetary bail, but 
“only when it is determined that no other conditions of release will reasonably 
assure the eligible defendant’s appearance in court.”252 In practice, however, 
monetary bail is hardly used because judges are hard pressed to find that no 
combination of nonmonetary release conditions would fail to ensure the 
purposes of bail.253 According to the Assignment Judge for Vicinage Ten 
Superior Court of New Jersey, from January 2017 through October of 2018, 
there have been only a dozen instances where monetary conditions have been 
imposed under the risk-based bail system.254 Moreover, money bail is used only 
against defendants with greater resources because with greater wealth, those 
individuals are more capable of fleeing the jurisdiction and evading the judicial 
process.255 
In August 2018, California’s Governor Brown signed into law a bill that will 
make California the first state to fully eliminate monetary bail.256 While the 
amendments to the pretrial detention statutes do not specify whether California 
will adopt the Laura and John Arnold Foundation’s algorithm, the wording of 
 
 247 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2017). 
 248 Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, supra note 225 (noting that Arizona adopted this system in 2014, Kentucky 
in 2011, and New Jersey in 2017). 
 249 Id.  
 250 Id.  
 251 See infra notes 294–299 (discussing the specific criteria that are used in this evaluation). 
 252 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2017). 
 253 Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 172. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Thomas Fuller, California Is the First State to Scrap Cash Bail, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/us/california-cash-bail.html. 
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the bill is fairly analogous to the states that have implemented that metric.257 The 
differentiating characteristic of the California statute is that it eliminates the 
wording that allows for monetary bail as a fallback in extraordinary 
conditions.258 
B. Procedures and Implementation of Nonmonetary Bail  
Under risk-based bail systems, there is a multi-step process from the time a 
suspected criminal is arrested until a final determination of release or detention 
is made.259 This Section analyzes the purposes of bail, to whom the risk-based 
bail schemes apply within the states of adoption, and then walks through the 
process of an ultimate release. These processes begin with a public safety 
assessment, discussed below, and five other factors that a judge weighs in 
considering an ultimate decision of release or detention.260 Once these 
considerations are weighed, California, Kentucky, and Alaska have fairly 
straightforward methods for determining whether to release or detain the 
accused.261 New Jersey, however, has a more defined and regimented scheme 
that requires a judge to essentially work through a checklist to arrive at the 
ultimate decision, considering any and all possible conditions on release and 
their potential efficacy.262 
The states that have adopted a risk-based approach to bail have fairly similar 
procedures for implementing such systems. The stated purposes for bail are to 
“reasonably assure an eligible defendant’s appearance in court when required” 
and “the protection of the safety of any other person or the community.”263 New 
Jersey’s statute is unique in that it includes preventing the accused from 
obstructing, or attempting to obstruct, the criminal justice processes.264 
However, unless there is a specific showing by the prosecution, there is a 
presumption that the defendant will not obstruct in the judicial process.265 The 
 
 257 Compare S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 
2017).  
 258 See generally S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.7 (Cal. 2018). 
 259 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16 (West 2017). See also S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
§ 1320.15 (Cal. 2018). 
 260 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017) (these factors, discussed below, include the weight 
of the evidence against the defendant, as well as the mental and physical characteristics of the accused). 
 261 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); S. 
10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.11 (Cal. 2018).  
 262 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17 (West 2017). 
 263 Id. See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.15 
(Cal. 2018). 
 264 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017). 
 265 Id. § 2A:162-17(e). 
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New Jersey statute does not provide examples of how a defendant would 
obstruct the judicial process;266 the lack of detail, coupled with the presumption 
that obstruction will not occur, seems to indicate that this is not a major concern 
of the courts. Yet, one could imagine that jury or witness tampering, as well as 
destruction of evidence, would be considerations under this purpose.  
To oversee the pretrial release or detention process, the states with risk-based 
systems have created pretrial assessment commissions.267 These commissions 
are comprised of members from various aspects of the state government, such 
as members from the state legislature, the attorney general’s office, prosecutor’s 
offices, and public defender’s offices.268 The purpose of these commissions is to 
ensure that the pretrial release and detention provisions adequately accomplish 
the stated purposes.269 Additionally, the commission conducts research into such 
provisions in other states to identify best practices and recommend necessary 
amendments to their own states’ legislation.270 
The nonmonetary bail systems apply to all eligible defendants, which has 
varying definitions amongst the states.271 Taken in conjunction, New Jersey, 
Kentucky, and California provide that any accused person who is subject to 
detention is entered into the nonmonetary bail system.272 In New Jersey, an 
“eligible defendant” is one who has been issued “a complaint-warrant . . . for an 
initial charge involving an indictable offense or a disorderly persons offense.”273 
In contrast, complaint-summonses do not render an accused eligible for a pretrial 
release or detention hearing under the new statutory framework because a 
summons does not carry with it the possibility of detention.274 Kentucky 
provides that “verified and eligible defendants,” those whom “pretrial services 
is able to interview and assess, and whose identity pretrial services is able to 
confirm,” are eligible for the risk assessment practices.275 California delineates 
who is eligible for nonmonetary bail by making it the default and exempting 
 
 266 See, e.g., id. § 2A:162-15. 
 267 See, e.g., id. § 2A:162-26. 
 268 See, e.g., id. 
 269 See, e.g., id. 
 270 See, e.g., id. 
 271 See, e.g., id. § 2A:162-18–19; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019). 
 272 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-18 (West 2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); S. 10, 
2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 1320.8–1320.10 (Cal. 2018).  
 273 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2017). 
 274 Id. § 2A:162-16. A complaint-warrant is the issuance of both a criminal complaint and an arrest 
warrant, while a complaint-summons is merely a criminal complaint and a court date for adjudication. Since a 
defendant is not detained pursuant to a summons, there is no need for a bail determination. See, e.g., N.J. 
MUNICIPAL COURT RULE 7:2-1 (2019). 
 275 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019). 
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certain classes of offenses.276 The California bill states that a person “arrested or 
detained for a misdemeanor” must be “booked and released without being taken 
into custody.”277 All other accused individuals are subject to the provisions of 
the new bail system.278  
The procedure leading to a pretrial release or detention decision begins with 
an analysis of the risk the defendant poses to public safety.279 First, the defendant 
needs to be detained.280 Once the eligible defendant is detained, a public safety 
assessment is conducted.281 In Arizona, Kentucky, and New Jersey, this public 
safety assessment employs the algorithm developed by the Laura and John 
Arnold Foundation.282 However, the states remain free to adopt any other system 
that they see fit because their legislatures have not designated a specific metric 
the state must rely on.283 Instead, the New Jersey statutory language only 
requires that the public safety assessment be “objective, standardized, and 
developed on analysis of empirical data and risk factors.”284 The requirement for 
objectivity entails that the assessment not factor in race, ethnicity, gender, or 
socio-economic status.285 
The next step in the pretrial release or detention process is that the public 
safety assessment returns a score and recommendations for release or 
detention.286 The “score” created by the assessment takes different forms in the 
various states. In California and Kentucky, the defendants are categorized as 
“low risk,” “medium-risk,” or “high-risk,”287 whereas New Jersey relies on 
numeric scores.288 Once the assessment categorizes the defendant and gives the 
associated recommendations, the court weighs certain considerations, which 
include the public safety assessment, to issue a pretrial release decision.289 To 
avoid judicial abuse, both California and New Jersey place a timing requirement 
 
 276 S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 1320.8, 1320.10 (Cal. 2018). 
 277 Id. § 1320.8. 
 278 Id. § 1320.9. 
 279 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(a) (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.20 
(Cal. 2018). 
 280 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(a) (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 281 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(a) (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
 282 Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, supra note 225; see infra notes 295–300 (discussing the specific criteria 
that are used in this evaluation). 
 283 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16 (West 2017). 
 284 Id. § 2A:162-25. 
 285 Id. 
 286 See, e.g., id. § 2A:162-16. 
 287 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.7 (Cal. 2018). 
 288 Holland v. Rosen, 279 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 289 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017); see also infra notes 305–311 (discussing the 
considerations employed). 
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on when the order of pretrial release or detention must be rendered.290 New 
Jersey’s statute requires that the decision be rendered within forty-eight hours of 
the defendant’s “commitment to jail,”291 and California’s legislation puts in 
place a limit of three court days.292 These limits are to ensure that a judge does 
not unreasonably delay a determination, effectively ordering the defendant’s 
detention. 
The public safety assessment employs nine factors that are associated with 
the risk of failure to appear, the risk of new criminal activity, and the risk of new 
violent criminal activity if the defendant is released.293 The following risk factors 
are included within the assessment: (1) the defendant’s age at the time of arrest; 
(2) whether the charged offense involved violence; (3) whether the defendant 
has another pending charge at the time of arrest; (4) whether the defendant has 
a prior misdemeanor conviction; (5) whether the defendant has a prior felony 
conviction; (6) whether the defendant has any prior convictions for violent 
crimes; (7) whether the defendant has failed to appear in court within the past 
two years; (8) whether the defendant has failed to appear in court over two years 
in the past; and (9) whether the defendant has previously been sentenced to 
incarceration.294 Each of these factors is weighted depending on the predictive 
correlation it has with the possibility of the defendant’s failure to appear, the risk 
of new criminal activity, and the risk of new violent criminal activity.295 For 
instance, if a defendant is under twenty-three years of age at the time of the 
current arrest, that factor is given two points under the risk for new criminal 
activity.296 Prior instances of failure to appear can receive zero, two, or four 
points, depending on the number of times that the defendant has missed a court 
date.297 A maximum of twenty-seven possible points can be attributed to a 
defendant; the higher the score, the riskier it is to allow the individual to be 
released pretrial.298  
 
 290 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(b) (West 2017). “Commitment to jail” means a temporary detention 
between arrest and the date of the bail hearing. Id. § 2A:162-16(a). 
 291 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(a) (West 2017). 
 292 S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.19 (Cal. 2018). 
 293 Risk Factors and Formula, PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT, https://www.psapretrial.org/about/factors 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2020). 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. (containing a table that depicts how each factor is weighted). 
 296 Id. 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id. 
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The information for the public safety assessment comes from electronic 
court records.299 This source limits the quality of the information that can be 
considered, as not all divisions within the judicial system are fully integrated.300 
As a result, the public safety assessment might not factor in the totality of the 
defendant’s past criminal convictions, or whether the accused has failed to 
appear in court, since such information may be contained in the records of other 
divisions. This limitation hampers the efficacy of the assessment and may have 
a particular impact if the court records of other states are not available to the 
judge presiding at the arraignment hearing. Due to the ease with which 
individuals can travel between states, and potentially engage in criminal activity 
while in another state,301 if those records are not factored into the public safety 
assessment, then courts do not have a full picture of the circumstances 
surrounding the defendant. Integrating all criminal records within the state, and 
amongst the states, would help better promote the purposes of bail.302 
The public safety assessment is only the first of six elements that a judge is 
to consider in reaching an ultimate decision on release or detention.303 Since the 
public safety assessment is mathematically based, it cannot take into account 
certain intangible facts or circumstances of the situation; thus, there is judicial 
discretion in reaching an ultimate decision on pretrial release. For the first of the 
additional factors, the presiding judge considers the nature and circumstances of 
the offense charged.304 If the charged crime is more violent or poses a greater 
danger to public safety, a judge has discretion to increase his determination of 
release conditions or detention. Second, the judge considers the weight of the 
evidence against the accused.305 If the evidence is substantial, there is a greater 
likelihood that the defendant will be detained.306 Third, the defendant’s history 
and characteristics are weighed.307 These characteristics include physical and 
mental conditions, family and community ties in the area, employment, and 
 
 299 Holland v. Rosen, 279 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 300 Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 172. 
 301 See, e.g., Report: Some Authorities Stop Search for Suspects at State Line, CBS NEWS (Mar. 12, 2014, 
10:18 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/usa-today-reports-criminals-cross-state-lines-to-elude-police-
capture/ (stating that criminal suspects cross state lines to avoid arrest). 
 302 See infra Part V.C for a greater discussion of this subject. 
 303 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017). 
 304 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.20 (Cal. 2018) 
(noting that certain violent offenses, such as crimes in which a weapon is used, should require greater conditions 
for release). 
 305 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.20 (Cal. 2018). 
 306 Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 172 (stating that if the evidence is 
substantial, there is more of a likelihood that the defendant will abscond so as to avoid conviction and prolonged 
detention in prison). 
 307 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017). 
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whether the defendant has a history of drug or alcohol abuse.308 The fourth 
relevant consideration is the nature and seriousness of the danger to a person or 
the community as a whole posed by the defendant.309 For instance, cases of 
domestic violence pose a higher risk to another person, the victim, due to the 
relationship between victim and defendant. Fifth, the court considers the risk of 
obstruction of the judicial process.310 While these five factors overlap with the 
public safety assessment, they allow for judicial discretion to diverge from the 
recommendations of the strictly numerically based assessment. These 
considerations are similar and traceable to the risk factors that originated in the 
Federal Bail Reform Acts of 1966 and 1984.311 Taken in conjunction, these 
considerations allow a judge to make a final determination of what course of 
action to take. 
Once all these considerations are evaluated, the defendant is placed into a 
certain category based on the relative risk of not appearing in court and the 
danger posed to the public.312 Alaska, California, and Kentucky have three tiers 
in which a defendant can be placed: low-risk, moderate-risk, and high-risk.313 
New Jersey has four categories: levels one through three and level three plus.314 
These classes inform the judge on what strategy to adopt with each defendant.315 
There are four possible outcomes from a pretrial release or detention hearing: 
(1) release the accused on his own recognizance; (2) release him on one or more 
nonmonetary conditions; (3) release him on monetary bail or combination of 
monetary bail and nonmonetary conditions; or (4) detain him.316 California’s 
approach, currently being stayed pending a ballot proposition, would offer only 
three of these outcomes since there is no option to impose monetary bail.317  
 
 308 Id.; see also Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 172 (noting that in cases where 
the defendant suffers from drug addiction, judges are likely to require the defendant to attend treatment programs 
as a condition of release). 
 309 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.10 (Cal. 2018) 
(for instances of domestic violence, a judge may impose a restraining order that forbids the defendant from 
contacting the victim of the charged crime). 
 310 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017); see supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
 311 For a discussion on the considerations used under those enactments, see supra Part II. 
 312 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); Holland 
v. Rosen, 279 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 2018). S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.07 (Cal. 2018);  
 313 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019); S. 10, 
2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.07 (Cal. 2018).  
 314 Holland, 279 F.3d at 281. 
 315 Id. 
 316 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16 (West 2017). 
 317 S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.10 (Cal. 2018). California’s nonmonetary bail legislation, 
which was passed and signed into law, was slated to take effect in October 2019, but was later stayed until the 
voters of California could vote on it. See, e.g., John Myers, California Voters Are Divided Over Bail Reform, 
Poll Finds, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2019, 5:36 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-10-01/ 
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Each state that has adopted a risk-based bail system differs in how to apply 
the risk factor evaluations to decisions on pretrial release. California would 
adopt a straightforward approach that is directly keyed to the category in which 
the defendant is placed. If the accused is determined to be low-risk, he is released 
on his own recognizance.318 Medium-risk defendants are released on supervised 
recognizance, which is defined by local court rules.319 If the defendant is 
classified as high-risk, the court orders pretrial detention.320  
Kentucky’s provisions are nearly identical to those of California, with the 
additional option of monetary bail.321 Low-risk individuals are released on their 
own recognizance in Kentucky, and medium-risk individuals are released 
subject to global position system monitoring, controlled substance testing, or 
increased supervision.322 Individuals who are high-risk may be detained or 
released subject to conditions, which include monetary bail.323 However, 
Kentucky also provides that any individual who has monetary bail imposed as a 
condition of release receives a credit toward that sum of one hundred dollars per 
day spent in pretrial detention.324  
In contrast, Alaska uses a hybrid of a risk-based and a resource-based model. 
Alaska’s statute calls for the release of any defendant not accused of certain 
crimes, namely violent crimes, sexual crimes, or domestic violence.325 Any 
combination of nonmonetary bail conditions can be imposed on these defendants 
to ensure that they will appear in court and will not pose a threat to the public.326 
However, Alaska maintains monetary bail for any high-risk individual.327 For 
low- and moderate-risk individuals, Alaska uses a risk-based model, but high-
risk individuals who have not seen a change in bail are still subject to monetary 
bail.328  
New Jersey’s framework for pretrial release determinations is the most 
thorough and requires working through a sequence of alternatives that become 
 
california-voters-divided-future-of-cash-bail-2020-election-poll. 
 318 Id. 
 319 Id. 
 320 Id. 
 321 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066 (West 2019). 
 322 Id. 
 323 Id.; id. § 431.520. 
 324 Id. § 431.066. 
 325 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018). 
 326 Id.  
 327 Id. 
 328 Id. 
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increasingly severe.329 There appear to be two competing approaches at play. 
First, there is a clearly delineated rubric that follows the categorization of the 
classes under the public safety assessment.330 Under this approach, Level One 
defendants are released and required to telephonically report to either a 
probation officer or member of pretrial services once a month.331 Level Two 
individuals report telephonically as well, but they also must report in person 
once a month and are subject to some monitoring conditions, such as a curfew.332 
Individuals classified as Level Three have the same conditions as Level Two 
with the addition of increased monitoring, such as designated areas where the 
defendant is not allowed to go.333 Level Three Plus defendants typically must 
wear a global positioning system as a condition of release, or are placed under 
house arrest.334 
However, under New Jersey’s statutory language, the determinations of 
conditions of release or detention progress mechanically as if through a checklist 
that appears to allow for great judicial discretion. Under this scheme, judges start 
by evaluating whether releasing the defendant on his own recognizance will 
reasonably assure that he will appear in court, will not pose a threat to public 
safety, and will not obstruct the judicial process.335 If the court finds that this 
lesser measure will not achieve the stated objectives, then it must evaluate 
whether release with certain conditions would do so.336 As possible conditions 
of release, the court may require that the defendant: (1) not commit any new 
offense while released; (2) avoid contact with the alleged victim; (3) avoid 
contact with any and all witnesses; and (4) comply with any other nonmonetary 
conditions the court finds necessary.337 The statute suggests other conditions of 
release that the judge may place on the defendant, including one or a 
combination of, (1) requiring that the accused remain in the custody of a 
designated person;338 (2) maintain employment, or if unemployed, seek a job; 
(3) maintain or commence an educational program; (4) refrain from associating 
with certain individuals; (5) comply with a curfew and report to a designated 
 
 329 Holland v. Rosen, 279 F.3d 272, 281 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 330 Id. at 282. 
 331 Id. 
 332 Id. 
 333 Id. at 282–83. 
 334 David Reimel III, Comment, Algorithms & Instruments: The Effective Elimination of New Jersey’s 
Cash Bail System and Its Replacement, 124 PENN. ST. L. REV. 193, 206 (2019).  
 335 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(a) (West 2017). 
 336 Id. § 2A: 162-17(b).  
 337 Id. 
 338 This appears to be a form of personal surety. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text (discussing 
personal surety). 
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law enforcement agency; (6) be placed on house arrest.339 In addition to 
enumerated conditions, the judge has the discretion to impose any other 
condition he finds necessary to reasonably assure court appearance and public 
safety.340 The sole constraint is that the combination of conditions must be “the 
least restrictive . . . that the court determines will reasonably assure” the stated 
interests.341 However, there is no language in the statute guiding judges on how 
to determine what constitutes a least restrictive approach.  
Since these conditions are broken into three separate groups in the statutory 
language, it appears that the judge is meant to assess whether the conditions of 
the first group would assure the purposes of bail before progressing to the second 
or third subsection.342 This approach would be analogous to the 1966 Act, which 
had tiered conditions of release.343 That version of the federal statute required 
that a judge “impose the first of the [listed] conditions of release which will 
reasonably assure the appearance” of the defendant at trial.344 Following the 
1966 Act, the more liberal federal bail system, would comport with the motives 
behind New Jersey’s bail reform. 
Judges may only impose monetary bail, either independently or in addition 
to any nonmonetary conditions necessary, when they find that no possible 
combination of nonmonetary conditions will ensure appearance in court.345 This 
provision for monetary bail is limited by the statutory language and in practice. 
The statute states that monetary bail is only allowed to ensure appearance in 
court and cannot be used as a condition to ensure public safety or prevent 
obstruction with the judicial process.346 This language imposes a safeguard 
against judicial abuse in that it does not allow a judge to order detention by 
imposing monetary bail that the defendant cannot afford.347 Moreover, in 
practice, judges are able to identify a combination of nonmonetary conditions 
that will ensure a defendant’s appearance in court, and thus they do not resort to 
monetary bail.348  
 
 339 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(2) (West 2017). 
 340 Id. 
 341 Id. 
 342 See id. § 2A:162-17(a)–(c).  
 343 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (amended 1984). 
 344 Id. § 3. 
 345 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(c) (West 2017). 
 346 Id.  
 347 Id. 
 348 Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 172. 
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Under New Jersey’s framework, a defendant can be detained while awaiting 
trial in two ways. First, a defendant charged with a crime involving domestic 
violence or certain felonies may be detained.349 To order pretrial detention, the 
prosecution must submit to the court clear and convincing evidence that no 
combination of nonmonetary conditions will protect public safety.350 There is a 
“rebuttable presumption that some amount of . . . nonmonetary conditions of 
pretrial release . . . will reasonably assure” the purposes of bail.351 Second, a 
defendant may be detained if he is charged with certain violent crimes,352 
including any crimes subject to life imprisonment.353 Under this set of crimes, 
there is a “rebuttable presumption that the eligible defendant shall be detained 
pending trial . . . .”354  
New Jersey’s bail system provides safeguards for the accused, even if they 
are detained while awaiting trial. The defendant is not to be imprisoned for more 
than ninety days355 while trial is pending.356 If no trial is commenced within that 
time, the defendant must be released unless the court finds an unjustifiable risk 
to public safety posed by release.357 Additionally, if the defendant is charged or 
indicted with another crime while detained, the ninety-day limits are to run 
simultaneously, not consecutively.358 This provision appears to be self-
defeating. If the defendant were detained initially, it was likely due to a danger 
to public safety.359 Thus, whether at the time of arrest or ninety days after, release 
would pose an unjustifiable risk to public safety. This is increasingly true when 
the initial detention decision was made with the possibility of imposing 
conditions of release. The provisions for the ninety-day limit, however, do not 
mention the possibility of release conditions.360 Therefore, the danger posed at 
the initial detention hearing that could not be mitigated through any combination 
of conditions would still be present at a later point where such conditioned 
release is not available. 
 
 349 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-19 (West 2017). 
 350 Id.  
 351 Id. § 2A:162-18(b).  
 352 Namely homicide, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, or robbery. Id. § 2A:162-19. 
 353 Id. 
 354 Id. 
 355 Id. § 2A:162-22 (not including reasonable delays). 
 356 Id. 
 357 Id. 
 358 Id. 
 359 See, e.g., id. § 2A:162-19. 
 360 Id. § 2A:162-22. 
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IV. NONMONETARY BAIL SYSTEMS SHOULD BE ADOPTED 
Among the states that have taken significant measures to substantially 
reduce or eliminate the use of monetary bail conditions, evidence of the 
successes or drawbacks of each scheme is available in varying degrees. Both 
Alaska and Kentucky still maintain monetary bail conditions for defendants who 
are found to be high-risk by the public safety assessment.361 Further, since the 
implementation of California’s bail reform legislation has been delayed, there is 
no current information on the impact it will have.362 Consequently, it is difficult 
to determine which changes in pretrial detention, decrease in recidivism while 
on bail, and increased flight are attributable to defendants released on monetary 
conditions versus nonmonetary ones. However, New Jersey’s new bail scheme 
has been in effect since 2017,363 and monetary bail conditions are practically 
nonexistent.364 As a result, the most illustrative statistics of the efficacy of 
nonmonetary, risk-based bail procedures come from New Jersey. Below, this 
Comment will discuss the arguments for and against nonmonetary bail reform. 
Section A addresses perceived drawbacks to nonmonetary bail systems. Section 
B rebuts those contentions and presents arguments in support of nonmonetary 
bail systems. Section C proposes certain alterations to current nonmonetary bail 
schemes that would allow states to more effectively implement and administer 
nonmonetary bail procedures. 
A. Perceived Failures and Deficiencies of Nonmonetary Bail 
Arguments against the shift toward risk-based, nonmonetary bail address 
three potential harmful effects: (1) economic loss to the state and certain 
industries therein; (2) increased administrative cost to the court systems that 
implement these schemes; and (3) decreased protection of public safety. Critics 
contend that the elimination of monetary bail costs the state court systems money 
since they no longer collect revenue from monetary bail.365 Additionally, 
 
 361 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.520 (West 2019).  
 362 See Jazmine Ulloa, Fate of Bail System Is Up to Voters; A Law to Abolish the State’s Cash System Is 
Put on Hold After Bond Companies Get a Ballot Referendum Certified, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2019, at B1.  
 363 See Holland v. Rosen, 279 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 364 Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 172 (stating that from January 2017 through 
October 2018, there have only been roughly a dozen instances in which monetary bail conditions were imposed 
on a New Jersey pretrial defendant). 
 365 See, e.g., Bill Armstrong, California Passed a Law to Put Me Out of Business—And Taxpayers Will 
Get the Bill, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/12/05/california-
passed-a-law-to-put-me-out-of-business-and-taxpayers-will-get-the-bill (“The California Assembly Appropriations 
Committee has estimated that the elimination of bail will cost the state hundreds of millions of dollars 
annually.”). 
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industries that center around monetary bail, such as bail-bondsmen, are no 
longer necessary, thus imposing a further cost to state residents.366 With regard 
to administrative costs, court systems now have to analyze and consider an 
increased amount of facts and evidence for each defendant at arraignment 
hearings,367 which in some states must occur in a limited timeframe following 
arrest.368 Such procedures may place a strain on the court system to comply with 
the requirements of these new bail enactments. Last, some argue that the new 
bail system is not as effective at protecting the public safety as prior schemes.369 
First, critics of the nonmonetary bail systems point to increased economic 
expenditures by states as a reason to maintain cash bail. Such financial burdens 
arise from two sources. One source of economic expenditures is the increased 
costs to the court that result from the need to monitor more released pretrial 
defendants and from the need to render release decisions within forty-eight 
hours.370 Next, states are no longer receiving revenue from defendants released 
on monetary conditions who forfeit their bail by not appearing in court or 
reoffending while released.371 
The New Jersey Pretrial Services Program consists of 267 supervisors, 
managers, and staff who administer the Public Safety Assessments necessary for 
pretrial release decisions.372 While there is not exact information on the salaries 
of these employees, such a large number of employees clearly places an 
economic cost on the state. Moreover, as a result of the increased number of 
defendants released while awaiting trial,373 there is a large expense associated 
 
 366 See id.; see also Christine Stuart, Murder Victim’s Mother Sues Chris Christie Over NJ Bail Reform, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.courthousenews.com/murder-victims-mother-sues-
chris-christie-nj-bail-reform/ (stating that a lawsuit to strike down New Jersey’s bail reform is funded by Duane 
Chapman, famous as “Dog the Bounty Hunter” on a television show by the same name). The residual impact to 
a state’s citizens is politically relevant as such residents can lobby state legislatures and vote in elections. See, 
e.g., Dustin Racioppi & Trenton Bureau, Special Interest Money Dominating in New Jersey, COURIER-POST, 
Sept. 14, 2018, at A16 (stating that interest groups fueled higher non-PAC spending in New Jersey’s 2018 
elections).  
 367 See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 131, at 32–33; Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra 
note 171. 
 368 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(b) (West 2017) (imposing a forty-eight-hour deadline from arrest 
until arraignment); S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.19(a) (Cal. 2018) (establishing a three-court day 
limit from arrest until final disposition of an arraignment hearing). 
 369 See, e.g., Thomas Moriarty, Murder Suspect Was Set Free Twice in Domestic Violence Cases, Records 
Show, NJ.COM (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2018/02/murder_suspect_was_released_ 
twice_on_domestic_viol.html; Stuart, supra note 366. 
 370 N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 9–10, 25. 
 371 See Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 171 (stating that cash bail is rarely used 
since the passage of bail reform measures). 
 372 N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 1, 3. 
 373 Id. at 4 (showing that the total jail population in New Jersey has decreased by roughly one-third since 
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with monitoring those individuals. Such monitoring can be, among others, GPS 
tracking, reporting to a law enforcement officer, or complying with a curfew.374 
There is an estimated cost to the state of $37.4 million per year for monitoring 
released pretrial defendants.375 Additional costs arose when New Jersey created 
twenty new judgeships solely to comply with the requirement that release or 
detention decisions be made within forty-eight hours.376 The existing judiciary 
was unable to keep pace with the number of hearings. The increased number of 
judges costs the state an additional $9.3 million a year.377 Despite these high 
expenses, the state judiciary only collects between $40 million and $45 million 
a year.378 These revenues come from court fees, filing fees, and defendants’ 
payments for monitoring services.379 As a result, pretrial services is running a 
deficit since it only raises, at maximum, $45 million and expends over $46 
million.380 The costs associated with monitoring released pretrial defendants are 
only expected to increase in the coming years as more technological monitoring 
systems are available and being imposed as a condition of release.381  
Moreover, courts are not receiving income from forfeited bail payments. 
Under monetary bail schemes, defendants pay money to courts to secure their 
pretrial release. If the defendants do not appear in court or have their release 
revoked for breaking a condition thereof, these payments are retained by the 
court systems. However, when monetary conditions are not allowed, or rarely 
used, the court does not receive this income. Therefore, there is an additional 
cost to the courts in lost revenue from bail payments.382 
In addition to the court systems, certain citizens, namely bail bondsmen, of 
states that have adopted nonmonetary bail are suffering economic hardship. Bail 
bondsmen operate as third-party surety for the defendant.383 By paying the 
pretrial defendant’s monetary condition for release and charging the defendant 
a premium for doing so, the bondsmen assume the potential liability from the 
 
the implementation of the nonmonetary bail system). 
 374 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-17(b)(2) (West 2017). 
 375 N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 9. 
 376 Id. at 10. 
 377 Id. 
 378 Id. at 9. 
 379 Id. 
 380 Id. at 25 (stating that pretrial services was expected to run a deficit in 2018). 
 381 Id. 
 382 But see id. at 4 (showing that New Jersey has a decreased pretrial jail population, leading to great 
economic savings, therefore there is no need to draw from other areas of the budget or for the courts to run a 
deficit). 
 383 See, e.g., Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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defendant for forfeiture of the bail.384 The risk of forfeiture of the monetary bail 
lasts until the resolution of the case, and potentially a probationary period.385 
Therefore, when New Jersey eliminated monetary bail conditions, it deprived 
bail bondsmen of their livelihood.386 Yet, New Jersey did not cancel monetary 
conditions that were imposed before the law was enacted.387 As a result, bail 
bondsmen must stay in business until the last defendant for whom they paid bail 
completes the judicial process.388 Bail bondsmen now operate businesses that 
only lose money. They monitor the defendants for whom they paid bail, but do 
not, and will not, receive any new business.389 This economic reality leaves 
many New Jersey bail bondmen in a precarious position. They must seek to find 
other means of earning a living, while simultaneously maintaining a failing 
business.  
Opponents of nonmonetary bail also criticize the administrative cost to the 
state judiciary in implementing these systems. These stresses are present in New 
Jersey where there is a forty-eight hour time limit for rendering a pretrial release 
decision,390 and will be present in California which places a three-court-day limit 
to render a decision.391 To comply with this requirement, New Jersey’s court 
system added judges and employees of the Pretrial Services Program.392 Since 
the requisite timeframe is forty-eight hours, regardless of when the defendant is 
issued a complaint-warrant, pretrial release and detention hearings must be held 
on weekends and holidays.393 In fact, pretrial hearings are held six days a week, 
every week.394 With 142,663 pretrial defendants subject to New Jersey’s new 
nonmonetary bail system in 2017,395 the court systems needed to analyze and 
consider an incredibly large amount of information in order for the judges to 
render release decisions. The workload proved too great for the existing judges, 
which led to the creation of twenty new judgeships.396 The administrative costs 
do not stop when a pretrial release decision is reached, as those defendants who 
 
 384 See, e.g., id. 
 385 See, e.g., Michaelangelo Conte, Bondsmen’s Lament: No Bail, No Livelihood, STAR LEDGER (N.J.), 
Nov. 25, 2018, at A21 (on file with author). 
 386 Id. 
 387 Id. 
 388 Id. 
 389 Id. 
 390 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(b) (West 2017). 
 391 S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.19(a) (Cal. 2018). 
 392 N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 9–10. 
 393 Id. at 3. 
 394 Id. 
 395 Id. at 16. 
 396 Id. at 10. 
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are released often must be monitored.397 With increasing numbers of defendants 
being released while awaiting trial,398 the resources and time required to monitor 
those individuals will only continue to place greater administrative costs on the 
state.  
The last main criticism of nonmonetary bail schemes is that they create an 
increased risk to public safety.399 Some argue that with fewer pretrial detainees, 
there are more dangerous individuals who are able to reenter society and commit 
further crimes. There are many sensational headlines and stories reported that 
help push this narrative. Such articles include one about a young man who was 
shot twenty-two times by an individual who had been released while awaiting 
his trial for possession of a firearm by a felon.400 Another describes a man who 
had twice been charged with domestic violence against his ex-girlfriend. While 
released pending that trial, he allegedly killed her.401 Those who oppose 
nonmonetary bail systems point to instances such as these to demonstrate that 
releasing more pretrial defendants will only lead to an increased risk to public 
safety.  
B. Successes of Nonmonetary Bail Systems 
On the other side of the argument, those who support the implementation of 
nonmonetary bail point to reasoning that falls into three main categories: (1) the 
is a greater respect for the rights of the accused; (2) the economic loss of 
monetary bail payments is outweighed by overcome by savings on other 
expenses; and (3) the administration of these schemes does not hamper the court 
systems. Respect for the rights of the accused stem from preserving their liberty 
interests and an equal application of the law, regardless of race or economic 
status.402 The increased economic costs of administering nonmonetary bail 
systems is more than made up for when by decreased expenditure on housing 
detained pretrial defendants.403 Additionally, courts have been able to implement 
 
 397 Id. at 9. 
 398 Id. at 4 (showing that the total jail population in New Jersey has decreased by roughly one-third since 
the implementation of the nonmonetary bail system). 
 399 See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 369; Stuart, supra note 366. 
 400 Stuart, supra note 366. 
 401 Moriarty, supra note 369. 
 402 Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, supra note 225. 
 403 See Annual Determination of Average Cost of Detention, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,863 (Apr. 30, 2018) (stating 
that an estimate of the average cost per inmate per day is $99.45); see also N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 4 
(showing that the total jail population in New Jersey has decreased by roughly one-third since the 
implementation of the nonmonetary bail system). 
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these new bail schemes, using greater information, without much strain on the 
court systems.404 
While the arguments against adoption of nonmonetary bail systems, on their 
face, appear compelling, they are unfounded, misleading, or are outweighed by 
other considerations. First, concerns over the economic impact to the court 
system do not factor in the amount of money that states save by incarcerating 
fewer pretrial defendants. Next, the disappearance of the bail bondsman industry 
in such states is outweighed by the greater respect given to the rights of pretrial 
defendants. Additionally, while there are greater administrative costs associated 
with nonmonetary bail schemes, the court systems have been able to adapt and 
efficiently render detention decisions and monitor released defendants. Last, 
instances of defendants committing crimes while released before trial, while 
compelling and saddening, are rare and are also present under compensatory bail 
conditions. 
While New Jersey’s Pretrial Services Program itself is running a deficit from 
monitoring released defendants and creating new judgeships,405 the state as a 
whole is saving money as a result of its nonmonetary bail system. In 
administering the new bail system, New Jersey’s Pretrial Services Program has 
revenues between $40 million and $45 million a year while expending over $46 
million.406 However, the number of pretrial defendants who are detained 
decreased by one-third, which equates to roughly 3,000 fewer pretrial 
defendants.407 Assuming the average length of pretrial detention of twenty-three 
days408 with the average cost per day of incarceration of $99.45,409 New Jersey 
saves over $2,015 per inmate released while awaiting trial. Multiplied by the 
almost 3,000-person decrease in pretrial jail population, New Jersey saves over 
$6 million a year on incarceration costs under the nonmonetary bail system. 
While Pretrial Services Program may run a deficit of $1 million to $5 million,410 
that figure is more than made up for by the decreased costs associated with 
detention. Additionally, predictions of increasing monitoring costs as more 
defendants are released with the condition of GPS monitoring will not overcome 
these savings. The daily cost of a GPS ankle monitor is $3 to $4, which is 
 
 404 Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 171. 
 405 N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 25. 
 406 Id. at 9–10. 
 407 Id. at 20. The decrease occurred over the two-year period, from one year before through one year after 
implementation of New Jersey’s bail system. Id.  
 408 VERA INST., INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 10 (2015). 
 409 Annual Determination of Average Cost of Detention, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,863 (Apr. 30, 2018).  
 410 N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 9–10. 
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negligible when compared to the over $87 it costs per day to incarcerate a pretrial 
defendant. 
Beyond merely the daily cost of incarcerating a pretrial defendant, New 
Jersey is saving additional costs. With the great reduction in prison population, 
overcrowding in prisons is no longer a pressing issue.411 In fact, in some prisons, 
there are entire wings that are empty.412 This reduction in detainees allows the 
state to decrease expenditures on prison guards, utility costs for unused portions 
of the prison, among other incidental costs.413 Potentially the greatest savings to 
the state with regard to prison population is that there is no foreseeable need to 
construct additional prisons or additional cells in existing prisons.414 Such 
economic benefit to the state is not limited to New Jersey, who has abolished 
cash bail in nearly all instances. Kentucky, which allows for monetary 
conditions on pretrial release in more cases, has been able to save over $161 
million associated with projected needs to expand and staff correctional facilities 
within the state.415 The ability of states to save money by not housing pretrial 
defendants runs counter to the trend of increased corrections spending in the 
United States over the past two decades. In the previous twenty years, state 
funding for corrections has risen from $12.9 billion to $48 billion, which 
represents an increase of approximately 272%.416  
The concerns raised by bail bondsmen, with regard to the disappearance of 
that profession in New Jersey, are greatly outweighed by the increased rights 
afforded pretrial defendants. The most obvious right that is protected is the 
defendant’s liberty interest. An individual’s interest in freedom from restraint 
has long been recognized as a fundamental right under the United States 
Constitution.417 However, this fundamental right is constrained under cash bail 
systems. Under monetary bail systems, low-income defendants are 
disproportionately affected.418 Such defendants cannot afford to pay even the 
lowest of monetary conditions placed on their release, so they remain in 
detention while awaiting trial.419 Many of these defendants are fired if they miss 
 
 411 Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 171. 
 412 Id. 
 413 Id. 
 414 See AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 2. 
 415 Id. 
 416 Id. 
 417 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 398 (1923) (overturning the incarceration of a man convicted 
for teaching German). 
 418 See, e.g., VANNOSTRAND, supra note 7, at 13. 
 419 Id. 
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a single day of work, thus their detention results in their unemployment.420 More 
striking is the disparate impact that pretrial detention has on minority 
populations. Black and Hispanic Americans have a median net worth that is 
between 8% and 10% of that of White Americans.421 Consequently, it is the 
racial and ethnic minorities who are more likely to be unable to pay the monetary 
conditions of bail. With the elimination of monetary bail, there is a decrease in 
the likelihood of disparate impacts on racial minorities associated with bail 
conditions. Additionally, defendants who are released while awaiting trial are 
less likely to be convicted.422 Since all defendants are presumed innocent until 
proven guilty,423 it is important to guard against wrongful convictions. 
Defendants who are detained before trial plead guilty more often than those who 
are released.424 In certain cases, pleading comes with no additional time in jail 
due to a credit for time served.425 If a greater number of defendants are released 
before trial, there is less of a risk that they will be convicted of a crime they did 
not commit. 
Criticisms of increased administrative costs in implementing nonmonetary 
bail systems are not supported by the evidence. The initial implementation of 
New Jersey’s bail reform measures necessitated hiring more judges and holding 
pretrial release or detention hearings six days a week.426 However, after these 
adjustments were made, the courts were able to comply with the forty-eight-hour 
limit for a release determination in 99.5% of cases.427 In fact, courts were able 
to reach a decision in under twenty-four hours in over 81% of cases.428 If the 
administrative costs associated with complying with this timeframe were so 
great, then courts would not be able to reach their decisions so efficiently. In 
order to expedite the pretrial detention decision process, courts have adopted 
unique and innovative ways to conduct such hearings. Some judges in New 
 
 420 Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, supra note 225. A pretrial defendant who becomes unemployed creates 
ancillary costs to the state through increased likelihood of the need for welfare assistance, leaving the tax base, 
and the potential need for care for dependents. See generally Michael McLaughlin et al., The Economic Burden 
of Incarceration in the U.S. (Wash. Univ. Concordance Inst. for Advancing Soc. Justice, Working Paper No. 
CI072016, 2016), https://joinnia.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/The-Economic-Burden-of-Incarceration-in-
the-US-2016.pdf. 
 421 Kochhar & Fry, supra note 9. 
 422 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 74, at 455. From the data, it is unclear whether there is a causation between 
pretrial detention and conviction or whether the link is merely a correlation. A pretrial defendant who is released 
may have better resources to pay for a private lawyer, or other variables that contribute to this connection. 
 423 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
 424 Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, supra note 224. 
 425 Id. 
 426 N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 3, 10. 
 427 Id. at 13. 
 428 Id. at 14. 
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Jersey have begun using virtual courtrooms to conduct the hearings needed for 
their bail decisions.429 These virtual courtrooms allow judges, translators, 
defendants, and prosecutors to use teleconferencing technology rather than 
being present in a physical courtroom.430 Doing so makes it more convenient to 
hold detention hearings on weekends and holidays because there is no need to 
coordinate opening the courthouse, having bailiffs present, and the travel of all 
necessary parties to the hearings. With these innovative, technological ways to 
reach pretrial detention decisions, and the high rate of decisions reached within 
forty-eight hours, any concerns about administrative costs are without basis.  
Finally, the data shows that there is no increased danger to public safety 
under nonmonetary bail systems; and such schemes may actually lower the rate 
of recidivism amongst pretrial defendants.431 Under the federal monetary bail 
system, 19% of defendants released before trial commit some form of pretrial 
misconduct.432 However, that figure is substantially lower under New Jersey’s 
nonmonetary bail system. Of the over 134,000 pretrial defendants who were 
released in 2017, only 698 violated the terms of their release to the extent that 
prosecutors sought to revoke their bail.433 That equates to roughly 0.5% of 
released pretrial defendants who committed actionable violations of their 
conditions of bail. Likewise, in Kentucky, 90% of pretrial defendants who were 
released did not commit new crimes while awaiting trial.434 When compared to 
the 13% from the federal statistics, it is clear that there is not a greater threat to 
public safety under nonmonetary bail systems than monetary systems. In fact, 
the risk factor analysis may in fact lead to less of a risk to the general public.  
C. Suggested Changes to Nonmonetary Bail Systems  
The perceived risks of nonmonetary bail are definitively outweighed by the 
actual impacts that such systems have had in the states that have adopted these 
schemes. While pretrial services programs may be running deficits,435 that 
difference is more than overcome by the money states save through decreased 
costs of incarceration of pretrial defendants.436 Moreover, the argument that 
 
 429 Id. at 24. 
 430 Id.  
 431 AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 2. 
 432 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: PRETRIAL RELEASE AND MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT 
COURTS 2008–2010, at 1 (2012). This figure was calculated from a sample size of 283,358 defendants in federal 
courts, 36% of which were released before trial. Id. at 3. 
 433 N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 18. 
 434 AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 2. 
 435 See supra notes 371–380 and accompanying text. 
 436 See supra notes 400–409 and accompanying text. 
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nonmonetary bail systems deprive bail bondsmen of a right to earn a living is 
outweighed by the greater protection of the presumptively innocent pretrial 
defendants. In addition, while implementing the risk-factor analysis requires 
greater administrative costs, courts have been able to effectively adapt to their 
new responsibilities.437 Last, there has been no increase in released pretrial 
defendants committing new crimes under the nonmonetary schemes; and, in 
fact, there may even be a reduction of such recidivism.438 Since the most cited 
criticisms of the elimination of cash bail are not actually present in states that 
have adopted nonmonetary bail, it is better to allow for greater respect of the 
rights of pretrial defendants. Basing release decisions on nonmonetary 
conditions does just that because such conditions do not discriminate based on 
income or racial lines. Allowing lower-income defendants to maintain their 
employment and mount better defenses,439 while they remain innocent in the 
eyes of the law, helps protect their liberty interests. 
That is not to say that the current nonmonetary bail systems cannot be 
improved upon to better promote the purposes of bail of assuring the defendant’s 
appearance in court and protecting the public safety.440 There are six areas in 
which risk-factor based bail systems can be improved. First, adjusting the time 
limit for pretrial release decisions would help alleviate certain stresses and 
administrative costs on the judiciary, especially when a state implements 
nonmonetary bail provisions.441 Second, by allowing pretrial detention for 
certain crimes that are not currently listed as acceptable detainable offenses, the 
public safety would be better protected.442 Moreover, a greater emphasis should 
be placed on crimes involving weapons in detention decisions as those offenses 
pose a great risk to the safety of others. Next, ensuring that judges have 
discretion in determining appropriate release conditions or making detention 
decisions would better account for the unique facts of each case to minimize any 
danger to the public.443 In addition, establishing a larger database of court 
records for the public safety assessment would allow judges to more accurately 
determine the risk of release of each defendant.444 Finally, using the weight of 
 
 437 See supra note 427 and accompanying text. 
 438 See supra notes 431–434 and accompanying text. 
 439 See supra notes 420–422. 
 440 See, e.g., Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2012). 
 441 See N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing the administrative costs associated with the adoption 
of nonmonetary bail systems). 
 442 See, e.g., Moriarty, supra note 3. 
 443 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 103 (2018) (describing the rise in gang 
violence and the crime rates of gang members, which is not currently a factor considered in a public safety 
assessment). 
 444 See Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 171 (stating that many court records 
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evidence against a defendant as a factor in a risk analysis seems to place a 
gradation on the absolute presumption of innocence afforded all defendants in 
the United States.445 These suggested improvements will be discussed below. 
First, as was seen in New Jersey, placing strict deadlines to reach pretrial 
release and detention decisions can have a large impact on the state judiciary. 
New Jersey’s requirement that, within forty-eight hours of a defendant’s arrest, 
a decision must be made about his pretrial release, forced that state to create 
twenty new judgeships and hold arraignment hearings six days a week, 
regardless of holidays.446 Over the course of implementation of the nonmonetary 
bail provisions, the court system was able to find new and innovative methods 
for holding arraignment hearings, such as virtual courtrooms,447 but such 
adaptations came after the court system added judges and incurred great expense 
to comply with the time limit.448 California’s approach may prove more 
effective. The California law, should it go into effect, would create a three court 
day deadline.449 This would alleviate the need for courts to hold arraignment 
hearings on weekends or holidays. However, detaining an individual for three 
days could have great detrimental impacts on the presumptively innocent 
defendant’s health and employment.  
A better approach may be to institute a tiered implementation of time limits 
on release and detention decisions, which would afford courts the ability to 
gradually change their practices to work more efficiently. Legislation could call 
for a three-court-day limit within the first few months that the law takes effect. 
After that period, the deadline could be lowered to two court days, before being 
lowered to twenty-four or forty-eight hours. Courts should continually strive to 
lower the time from arrest to detention decision so as to limit the negative effects 
suffered by each defendant. With each step in this accelerating process, courts 
would have the ability to identify and implement best practices to ensure 
compliance with the deadlines, while simultaneously not unduly taxing their 
resources. Within one year of New Jersey implementing its forty-eight-hour 
requirement, courts were able to render decisions within that timeframe in nearly 
every case, and within twenty-four hours in 81% of cases.450 States can strive to 
continually shorten the time allowed for release decisions, but by gradually 
 
cannot be accessed for a public safety assessment). 
 445 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (describing the presumption of innocence). 
 446 N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 3. 
 447 Id. at 24. 
 448 Id. at 10. 
 449 S. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1320.19(a) (Cal. 2018). 
 450 N.J. COURTS, supra note 1, at 14. 
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reducing them, courts will have the opportunity to adjust without the need for an 
ever-expanding judiciary. 
Next, by adjusting the crimes that render a defendant eligible to be detained, 
states can better protect the public safety. States that have adopted risk-based 
bail systems allow detention of defendants charged with certain felonies and 
domestic violence.451 Such crimes involve a great deal of violence and risk to 
vulnerable members of society. In order to effectively protect members of 
society who cannot defend themselves, such as children, the list of crimes for 
which a defendant should be eligible for detention should be expanded. 
Moreover, these crimes should carry more weight in the detention decision as 
they pose higher risks to the safety of vulnerable members of society. For 
example, in New Jersey, the leader of a child pornography distribution network 
was released under the risk-based bail system.452 Children are unable to fend off 
the predatory tendencies of adults.453 Allowing for greater detention of 
defendants accused of crimes against children and other especially susceptible 
members of society would benefit public safety.  
Similarly, the metrics used to evaluate a defendant’s risk of flight or danger 
to public safety must be continually evaluated and adjusted as necessary to 
ensure the success of nonmonetary bail schemes. As more pretrial release and 
detention decisions are reached under risk-based bail systems, states should 
continually analyze the relative success of the considerations used in reaching 
those decisions. States must see whether there is, for example, a correlation 
between defendants who are charged with certain crimes and failure to appear 
or recidivism, or between other characteristics of a defendant that are not 
currently factored into the analysis and the purposes of bail. If the data shows 
that certain classes of defendant’s pose greater risk if released, there needs to be 
a commensurate adjustment in how pretrial release decisions are made. 
In addition, there must be a preservation of judicial discretion in pretrial 
release decisions. There is a unique set of facts and circumstances that surround 
each defendant and each offense. These infinite permutations are incapable of 
being reduced to a solely mathematical algorithm to determine the risk posed in 
 
 451 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011 (West 2018); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-19 (West 2017). 
 452 Joseph McCormick, Leader of Child Porn Distribution Network Free to Go Under NJ Bail Reform, 
U.S. BAIL REFORM NEWS (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.usbailreform.com/leader-child-porn-distribution-
network-free-go-nj-bail-reform/. 
 453 See, e.g., Jessica Snyder Sachs & Melissa Bykofsky, How to Protect Your Child from a Predator: 
Recognizing the Warning Signs, PARENTS.COM, https://www.parents.com/kids/safety/other-safety-issues/ 
protect-your-child-from-a-predator/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2020) (stating that children are less likely to report 
crimes due to confusion, fright, or a sense of guilt). 
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every case. The role of the judge is to account for the unique facts. For example, 
the algorithm used in many states, the one promulgated by the Laura and John 
Arnold Foundation,454 does not factor in known gang affiliation. If a defendant 
is involved in gang activity, there is a greater risk that he will engage in criminal 
behavior while on pretrial release.455 Judicial discretion must supplement the 
purely mathematical approach of the public safety assessment. By factoring in 
the additional characteristics of the defendant and the offense, the judge’s 
discretion will better protect public safety and assure a defendant’s appearance 
in court.  
Further, there must be greater integration of court records, both within each 
state and among the states. Currently, not all court records within a state are 
included in the database that supplies information for the public safety 
assessment.456 This issue is not limited to risk-based bail systems. In fact, it has 
been present for decades.457 In order to gain a complete picture of each 
defendant’s risk upon release, all available information must be evaluated. The 
lack of information shared amongst the states is potentially more important 
given the relative ease with which individuals can cross state lines and commit 
crimes.458 A defendant might be charged with his first offense in a state using 
risk-based bail, but that same defendant may have a long criminal record with 
multiple missed court dates in another state.459 Since the public safety 
assessment only has access to court records of one state, it is not possible to 
determine the precise danger each defendant poses if released; but, with 
additional information, courts will be able to more accurately assess the risk. By 
integrating court records throughout the state and amongst the states, courts can 
more effectively decide the conditions of release, if any release is warranted, for 
each defendant.  
The last area of change is that the weight of evidence against a defendant 
should not be a factor in pretrial release decisions. In the United States, there is 
a presumption of innocence for criminal defendants.460 This presumption applies 
to all defendants, not merely defendants against whom the government has a 
weak case. The weight of evidence against a defendant is used as a factor in risk-
based bail decisions because if a defendant believes it is more likely he will be 
 
 454 Initiatives: Pretrial Justice, supra note 224. 
 455 See, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 443. 
 456 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 171. 
 457 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 458 See, e.g., Report: Some Authorities Stop Search, supra note 301. 
 459 Id. 
 460 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
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found guilty, there is a greater chance that he will attempt to flee before trial.461 
However, there are other ways to measure a defendant’s risk of flight that do not 
negate the fundamental presumption of innocence that has been present since 
the writing of the Book of Deuteronomy.462 In fact, there are factors already 
contained within the public safety assessment and judicial considerations that 
account for the likelihood a defendant will flee. The public safety assessment 
accounts for past missed court dates.463 Additionally, the judge is to consider the 
characteristics of the defendant.464 These characteristics include family ties, 
employment, financial resources, and other ties to the community.465 All of these 
factors have a bearing on whether the defendant will attempt to flee the 
jurisdiction of the court. The fewer the ties to the community around the 
presiding court, the more likely the defendant will escape the jurisdiction. 
However, if the defendant is connected to and engrained in the community, there 
is less of a likelihood that he will flee. Moreover, nonmonetary conditions on 
bail can assure a defendant’s appearance in court. State statutes already allow 
for GPS monitoring of a defendant.466 Such monitoring does not carry with it 
the negative effects associated with pretrial detention, but it does help assure the 
purposes of bail. Since there are already factors designed to account for the risk 
of flight, there is not a need to disregard or qualify a fundamental presumption 
of the American criminal justice system.  
CONCLUSION 
Nonmonetary bail systems have greatly advanced the rights of pretrial 
criminal defendants while at the same time reducing state expenditures on 
incarceration and better protecting public safety. Bail is intended to protect 
public safety and assure that the defendant will appear at all requisite court dates. 
At its advent, bail never required a defendant to pay for his freedom. That 
practice only emerged over a century after the founding of the United States, and 
subsequently expanded so that bail and cash payments became synonymous. 
There are numerous other conditions or measures that can be imposed on a 
defendant so as to assure public safety and presence in court.  
 
 461 Telephone Interview with Stuart A. Minkowitz, supra note 171. 
 462 See Coffin, 156 U.S. at 454 (tracing the presence of the presumption of innocence from Biblical times, 
through antiquity, to the American judicial system). 
 463 Risk Factors and Formula, supra note 293. 
 464 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-20 (West 2017). 
 465 See, e.g., id. 
 466 See, e.g., id. § 2A:162-17(b)(2). 
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Several states have taken steps to substantially eliminate, or outright abolish, 
monetary conditions of bail. The success of nonmonetary bail can be seen 
throughout the states that have implemented such schemes. Whether economic 
benefit, stable or decreased rates of recidivism by pretrial defendants, or smooth 
and efficient application of such legislation, nonmonetary bail has many 
positives, and limited discernible pitfalls that can be overcome with slight 
adjustments to existing provisions. The trend of eliminating monetary conditions 
of bail will only continue to expand as states recognize the benefits. With certain 
minor alterations, the systems employed by states such as New Jersey and 
Kentucky can serve as exemplars for states who hope to adopt similar measures. 
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